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P\JrPoS!O!S: The purposes of this investigation were 
to identify the use of paid lobbyists within California 
school districts, to describe the legislative lobbying, ________ __ 
activities of superintendents, and to compare the 
perceptions of superintendents and legislators to determine 
effective lobbying practices. 
PXoC!O!P.\Jr.!O'S: Based upon a review of the scholarly 
literature two survey instruments were developed and field 
tested by the investigator. The superintendents' sample, 
(N=171/66 percent) represented a random selection of 25 
percent of the state's school districts. Members of the 
1987 California State Legislature, (N=77/58 percent), 
represented the comparison sample. Analysis of the data 
used the Statistical Program for the Social Sciences. Data 
collected for the investigation were statistically analyzed 
through the use of frequency distributions, calculation of 
the means, chi square tests of association, and two way 
analysis of variance. 
se.leGt.e.P. F .. in.cl..i.ngs : 
1. School district-legislative contacts 


















3. Fifteen significant differences at the 
. 01 level were found with respect to the 
variables of district size and the lobbying 
activities of the superintendents. 
4. There is a marked discrepancy between the most 
effective lobbying activities identified by 
the superintendents and the lobbying 
activities they use with greatest frequency. 






tactics with qreater frequencv even ___ tbnuq~hL_ ______ __ 
they believe that the direct advocacy tactics 
are more effective. 
Superintendents identify job demands and 







indicate that they have a need 
in lobbying methods and 
Members of the legislature 
superintendents-in-general 
lobbyists. The impact of 
general is neutral. 
do ~ot believe that 
are effective 
superintendents-in-
Members of the legislature believe that 
superintendents-specific are effective sources 
of information. 
Legislators hold high positive views regarding 
the effectiveness of principals as sources of 
information, a view not held by the 
superintendents. 
10. Legislators have high regard for their own 
inside expert sources of information and for 
their own legislative reports. 
l 
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10 The Universe of the 
Politics of Education 
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As lobbies go, education is a powerful j one at city, state, and federal levels 
i------------------<t;;~~~-~R-=-x_i=-i p~::~:~;_~ 1edu8~e~~~8i6~n-~~~-b~_· ~~{-~~~-~,----
]
- officials, parents and students that 
probably match or exceed in strength the 
• lobbies for any other purpose. 1 
j 
.3 
Based on the intensity of this statement which 
includes school officials as part of the education lobby, a 
fundamental question arises regarding the nature and extent 
of school administrators' involvement in lobbying activi-
ties. The answer to this question and the possible 
reassessment and redefinition of the legislative lobbying 
role of school superintendents may well be of great 
importance, particularly within the State of California 
where ongoing school finance battles threaten the very 
foundation of public education . 
By becoming aware of the importance of the inter-
active process between governmental organizations and school 
1David Vidal, "As Lobbies Go, Education is a Powerful 





administrators as a legally recognized group, administrators 
will be in a better position to respond effectively in 
providing knowledgeable leadership in the universe of 
political decision-making. As a consequence of this under-
standing, administrators can then begin to study critically 
the linkages and the techniques by which they can expand 
their sphere of influence. At the present time there is no 
statewide description of school district-legislative linkage 
networks. It is to this end that this study would seem to 
make a contribution by helping school superintendents 
develop awareness of their "gross power potential," or 
degree of ultimate effect with members of the state 
legislature.2 
The purposes of this study are as follows: 
1. To describe the use and activities of paid lobby-
ists within California school districts. 
2. To describe school administrators' views towards 
their educational lobbying activities with state 
legislators. 
3. To describe the lobbying activities of school 
administrators with state legislators. 
2 Arthur J. Field, !.!:t::bi:!n ..... PRw.!i!.L ... S .. tructur!i!s; .......... J'rPblem<L ... in 
.Th.!i!PrY.. .... i:!nd .... Res .. e.ar.G.h (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1970), 39. 
4 
4. To describe the views held by school administra-
tors regarding the effectiveness of their lobbying 
activities with state legislators. 
5. To compare the views of school administrators with 
those of state legislators regarding effective 
lobbying strategies. 
I.~.imi .. t.a.t.iOIH'L .... Q;[_th.e ....... S ..t.\l.dY 
This descriptive study will be limited to a random 
sample of California school districts. Respondents will be 
limited to district superintendents and to members of the 
1986-87 California State Legislature. 
For this study the term P.Olit.i.cs .... Qf .. ed.ucation will 
be based on an elaboration. of Eliot's definition. The 
expanded definition of poJi.t.ics _Q_;L .. ed.ucatiPn is as follows: 
the effort to gain or keep the power to make or affect those 
governmental decisions which have direct or indirect effect 
on the educational system and on the participants who are 
intimately associated with that system.3 
3"Politics includes the making of governmental 
decisions, and the effort or struggle to gain or keep the 
power to make these decisions.'' Thomas H. Eliot, ''Toward an 
Understanding of Public School Politics," Am.e.t:i.c.an .. Politica1 
S.c.i.enc_e ___ Re:v.iew, LIII (December 1959), 1035. 
J 
5 
A .r.l1!9:ilil.ter.tl\l.. __ J.o.b.l;>yi::;_t is a legally defined term 
and refers to those ''individuals or business entities paid 
to communicate directly with any state, agency or 
legislative office for the purpose of influencing 
legislative action and who engage in such activities on a 
substantial or regular basis anyone paid more than 
$5000.00 a quarter, or who makes at least twenty-five 
contacts with officials in two consecutive months. "4 In 
addition, a registered lobbyist is one who is registered 
under law with the Fair Political Practices Commission, 
Office of the California Secretary of State. 
The term .lo.bPYilil .. t, for the purposes of this inves-
tigation, refers to the individual given school board 
approval to engage or foster the district's purpose with 
governmental units, particularly with members of the 
California State Legislature. 
s_c_l:!QR.L_!>.uPe.rin.t .. enden.t.s. for the purposes of this 
investigation refers to those individuals identified as the 
chief executive administrator in a California school 
district. 
The term st<!.te __ leg.is.la_tQt: includes any individual 
who holds the elected position of state senator or assembly-
man as defined by the California State Constitution. 
4Joanne R. Creager, ''The Underground: Loophole Allows 
Unregistered Lobbyists to Thrive," CaliJornia.JQUrna,l XIII 
(February, 1986), 104. 
6 
~ro.c .. e.O.ur~ .. s. 
The procedures for this study employed the use of 
descriptive research techniques, namely the use of surveys, 
as the prime method of data collection. The purposes of 
survey studies, according to Isaac and Michael, are to: 
collect detailed factual information that describes existing 
phenomena; to make comparisons and evaluations; and to de-
1------t-.e...rmi..ne____wh i1 t-oth-e-.r-s-a-~e-GG-i-ng-w-i-t--R-s-i-m-i-1-a-r-s-i-t--a-a-~i-o-n-s-i--n-or~-----
der to make future plans.s 
A review of relevant literature was conducted to 
identify current research regarding school administrators' 
lobbying practices with state legislators. Two survey 
instruments were developed, one survey for school adminis-
trators and one for state legislators, in order to gather 
specific information regarding district-governmental link-
ages and lobbying practices. Following the review of the 
survey instruments by a panel of experts knowledgeable about 
school district operations and the workings of the state 
legislature, a pre-post field test was conducted to insure 
survey reliability. Information collected from a random 
sample of school administrators and the members of the 
California State Legislature was analyzed to determine the 
significance of lobbying practices used by school admin-
istrators. 
5 Stephen Isaac and William B. Michael, !:!an<:'tboPk .. in 
Res.ear.cll .. _il.n<:'t ... EY;;;J.ua.tion (San Diego: Edits Publishers, 1979), 
18. . 
7 
Validation of the survey instrument was through 
the use of a panel of experts, two university professors and 
two school district administrators knowledgeable in the 
fields of research and legislative change. The panel 
reviewed the instrument for clarity, logic, usefulness, and 
1-------LJorm_. __ upon--r-e-cei-P-t-G-f-t-he-i-F--i-B-~-a-q--~h-e-i-n-s-t-r-u-m-e-n-t-wa.c:-----! 
modified as necessary. 
The field test of the survey instrument involved 
the use of a limited sample of school superintendents who 
responded to a matched pre-post rating of the instrument in 
order to determine reliability. 
Based upon the 1986 California Public Schools 
Directory published by the California State Department of 
Education, a random sample of school districts was selected. 
These districts represented 25 percent of the districts in 
the state. Efforts were made to include at least one 
district from each county. Survey respondents were district 
superintendents. 
All members of the 1986-87 California State Legis-
lature constituted the comparison survey sample. Procedures 
for non-respondents in the legislative group included the 
use of follow-up letters. 
8 
S.t.9-.:ti s..t .. i c.c;;l .... . .T. r..e. a t..m.e.n.t ....... of .... J;.h~LD.a .:t a 
Data collected for the . ~ . ~ . ~nves_::.gaL~on were 
statistically analyzed through the use of frequency 
distributions, calculation of the means, chi square tests of 
association, and two way analysis of variance. To determine 
the degree of significant differences between 
superintendents and state legislators regarding lobbying 
practices, the .01 level was used as the measure of 
statistical significance in the study. 
Qrgg_n.iza.t.ion. ..... o.f. ...... the. ... _S.t.v.dy 
Chapter 1 presented an overview of the investi ga-
tion. In Chapter 2, a review of the relevant scholarly 
research and literature was presented. Chapter 3 described 
th e population, procedures and statistical treatment of the 
data. The data were analyzed and discussed in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 described the conclusions of the study and the 
recommendations for further study. 
9 
Chapter 2 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE 
l-----------~ .. ~.n~tLO.ruJ~~ti-~.n~. --------------------------------------------------------------
1 
In America, the "history of lobbying is, in 
effect, the history of American legislation. "1 The "zeal 
for different opinions concerning government is," in the 
famous words of James Madison, "the propensity of mankind." 2 
Recognition of the American passion for diverse opinions and 
interests became the cornerstone of the First Amendment to 
the Constitution: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging 
the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the 
people to peaceably assemble and to petition the government 
for redress of grievances."J If education legislation is to 
be of benefit to schools and ultimately to its students, the 
effective democratic system requires, and is dependent upon, 
the quality and quantity of information available to elected 
1Karl Schriftgiessel, The Lobbyist: The Art and 
Business of Influencing Lawmakers, (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1951), 3. 
2James Madison, The Federalist, Number 10, (University 
of Chicago. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 50. 
3 United States Constitution, Amendment I. 
10 
policy makers prior to the enactment of legislative 
mandates. 
Within the current scholarly literature there 
exists considerable confusion regarding the functional and 
differential definitions of pressure groups, interest groups 
and lobbyist groups. Attempts at definition by political 
scientists usually have been based on ''claims that interest 
groups are concerned with hard material goals, pressure 
groups are concerned with less self interested, more altru-
istic goals and policies.''• Since it is the intent of the 
investigator to focus on superintendents' leadership activi-
ties in the politics of education, which at times has both 
economic and altruistic ends, the terms pressure, interest 
and lobbyist groups will be used interchangeably and will 
include appropriate references from the literature as it 
applies to the politics of education. 
In order to provide a conceptual framework for the 
discussion of state politics of education and the impact of 
the superintendents' leadership role, the investigator 
presents a modification of the Easton model of political 
systems. Easton states: 
From from a methodological point of 
view we can simplify problems of analysis 
enormously without violating the empirical 
data in any way, by postulating that any set 
of variables selected from description may 
4 Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups in the United 
States, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 4. 
11 
be considered a system of behavior .... We 
delimit the system because some variables 
have greater significance in helping us to 
understand the political areas of human 
behavior .... By conceptualizing political 
life as a system we shall be able to 
introduce a range of matters for analysis 
that are otherwise difficult to grapple 
with .... and thereby, pose questions with 
regard to the kinds of exchanges that the 
system has with its environment, and to the 
way in which the members of the system 
respond to these exchanges .... My approach to 
the analysis of political systems will not 
help us to understand why any specific 
t----------------iP-O_l_i_c_i_e_s_a re_a-dap_tP_n R-a-th-e-r-,-5-Y-S-t-e-m----: 
analysis is designed to clarify the 
consequences .... It is clear, that if a 
l 
1 
systems conceptualization suggests little 
else it does present a dynamic model of a 
political system. As demands and support 
flow through the system it is able to get 
something done.s 
In the model shown in Figure 1, The Universe of 
the Politics of Education, the system is limited to interest 
groups, superintendents and to members of the state 
legislature, key actors in the present investigation. The 
exchanges in the system are confined to two classifications 
of lobbying practices, the tactics of advocacy and the 
strategies of influence. 
The major questions this study will attempt to 
answer are: How effective are these lobbying practices when 
used by superintendents as input strategies? And, are there 
important differences in perception between superintendents 
and legislators regarding the utility of these lobbying 
strategies to achieve educational policy outcomes? 
5 David Easton, lL.Frg,m.ework .. f.or ... Po1it.iG<!l.J\.ng,1ysis, 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965), 30-132. 
j 






















I r Policy 
12 
~ 
The review of the literature in this chapter will " 
be based upon the elements of the theoretical model 
presented in Figure 1. The organization and focus of the 
chapter will be on interest groups, the tactics of advocacy, 
the strategies of influence, administrative interest groups, 
superintendents' leadership role and attitudes of state 
legislators. 
l..n.te.r.e.s.t ...... G.r.oups 
Interest groups have had a long history of 
involvement and interplay within the American political 
scene. In the United States, one-third of the adult popula-
tion has voluntary association with some type of interest 
13 
group. 6 Through this form of political action, "interests 
not well defined in American society" have a mediating link 
with government. 7 Interest groups differ from political 
parties in that the former seeks to "influence specific 
policies of government" while the latter "concentrates on 
winning public office" and is generally ''less concerned with 
policy questions.••s 
In a political context, according to Pres thus, 
interest groups can be viewed as a "structural mechanism 
linking the atomic individual to the formal political 
apparatus."9 Interest groups serve the "functional 
requisite of 'democratic participation' in government 
because they provide the citizen with the 'means' of 
access."1° The "essence of modern interest group politics 
is the intimate relationship of organized pressures in the 
day-to-day decisions and processes of government.'' 11 
One of the important functions of interest groups 
is that they serve as an information and education source to 
both elected officials and to the general public in 
6 Thomas R. Dye, .Pol.i.t.i.c.s .. in._S.t<:~.tes __ <\n.d. Communities 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 66. 
7 Dye, 81. 
8 Dye, 82. 
9 Robert Pres thus, lUites __ ;i.n ___ :the .. _Poli.cY .. :E'roces.s, 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 54. 
10Presthus, 55. 
11 s. J. Makielski, Jr. Pr_essJ.u::.e ... :E'oli.ti.c:> ... Jn bmeriG<~, 





"creating an environment favorable to the interest group and 
its program."12 
The interlace of public and private spheres also 
gives ''shape and direction to individual issues in providing 
policy guidelines and information without which the govern-
mental elites, members of the legislature, would find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to carry out their roles in 
the accommodation process.''ll 
In discussing interest groups, govern-
mental elites often remark, 'We need their 
information to determine the implications of 
proposed legislation;' 'We cannot handle a 
great mass of uncoordinated claims;' 'They 
tell us what people are thinking.' As these 
judgments suggest, technical expertise and 
ideological information regarding policy 
issues are major contributions. Neither 
legislators nor bureaucrats can hope to be 
expert enough to proceed without drawing 
upon the knowledge of those interests 
directly affected and involved in a given 
sector.14 
Regarding the critical role of interest group 
directors and lobbyists Presthus suggests that these elites 
possess the political attributes of functional expertise and 
ideological perspective; advantaged socioeconomic status, 
compared to ordinary citizens; official roles as designated 
leaders; political access to other elites, namely members of 
the legislature; and personal commitment to the ongoing sys-
tern of interest group politics and their own role in the 





accommodation/lobbying process. The only difference between 
lobbyist elites and legislative elites is that the lobbyist 
does not have legitimation based on elected authority. 
Lobbyist elites have functional legitimation based upon 
their expertise.ls 
Loomis and Cigler, in their analysis of the 
changing nature of interest group politics, identify seven 
major trends and forces currently operating in today's 
society which support and enhance the existence of lobbyists 
and interest groups: 
1. The increase in the number of interest groups 






The major technological 




The changes in campaign finance laws and the 
establishment of political action committees. 
The rise of single issue lobbies. 
The increased formal penetration of political and 
economic interests into the bureaucracy through 
the use of advisory committees. 
The continuing decline 
ability to perform key 
related activities. 
of political parties' 
electoral and policy 
7. The increased numbers, activity and visibility of 
'public interest' lobbies.16 
Practical politicians and scholars alike generally 
concur that interest groups, also known as factions, 
1spresthus, 67. 
16 Burdett A. Loomis and Allen J. Cigler, I.n.ter.es.t 




pressure groups, special interests and lobbies are a natural 
phenomena in a democratic regime. "17 However, Loomis and 
Cigler further observe that as the "number of new lobbies 
rise and as existing lobbies become more active, the pres-
sure on decision makers --especially legislators --mounts at 
a corresponding rate.••1a 
In analyzing the effectiveness of new interest 
groups, Dye reports: 
Size of the group is an important vari-
able in its leadership effectiveness as a 
middleman. Access to legislators is 
enhanced by a large membership, since 
elected officials are sensitive to numbers. 
However, large groups find it difficult to 
commit themselves to an explicit position 
since their membership is so heterogeneous. 
Policy positions must be vague, broad and 
devoid of specific content. Generally mass 
membership groups achieve symbolic success, 
while smaller, more cohesive groups are able 
to persist in the pursuit of limited objec-
tives.19 
The influence of interest groups in legislative 
decision making varies from state to state. When legisla-
tors from selected states were asked what interest groups 
they perceived as powerful, ·California legislators referred 
to fifty-six specifically named organizations: New Jersey 
named thirty-eight formal organizations; Ohio legislators 
named sixty-eight organizations; and Tennessee lawmakers 
17Loomis and Cigler, 3. 
1BLoomis and Cigler, 26. 
1 9 Thomas R. Dye, The ... JronY ... oJ.J)emo.GracY, 2d ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 223-24. 
17 
mentioned forty organizations. Business interests were 
named as most powerful in all four states and educational 
interests were named as second most powerful in three 
states. 20 
Block in discussing the California Journal's 
survey of the lobbying industry, reports that 
''significantly, no one lobbyist, lobbying firm, or employing 
interest group emerged as dominant. A total of 52 different 
advocates received at least one mention; 'highlighting a 
comment scrawled across one survey: Who is most effective? 
From time to time, all of us.'''21 It is difficult at best 
to draw conclusions based on the data of this study. The 
California Journal attempted to survey 1100 lobbyists, 
legislators and legislative staff. . Only two hundred 
responses were received, an 18% response rate. The survey 
was unofficially boycotted by the Institute of Governmental 
Advocates, an association of eight hundred contract 
lobbyists. 
Interest groups have played a long and 
important part in American political history by fostering 
the individual's participation in essential democracy. The 
function of interest groups is two fold: to create a 
climate favorable to its issues and to serve as an 
information source to elected officials. 
2 0 Thomas R. Dye, Pol.itics .. i .. n .... S .. ta.t.e .. s ........ and .. Comm.unities, 
80. 
21A. G. Block, "Who's the.Best?".Californi<I ...... J.ourn'll 
XIII (February, 1986), 73. 
I 
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Since 1960 the numbers, sizes, types and 
visibility of interest groups has increased. The increase 
is due in part to the explosion in media technology, the 
rise of political action and advisory committees, as well as 
the inability of political parties to address specific 
issues. As the numbers of interest groups increases there 
appears to be a direct correlation in the amount of pressure 
exerted and felt by state legislators. 
Interest group lobbyists are defined as elites in 
the accommodation process. The use of the term 'elite' 
refers to four characteristics: The official lobbyist role, 
his generally higher economic status, his level of knowledge 
and expertise, and his access to other elites . 
. T.a.c .. t .. i .. c.s.o.f. ..... A.Q.vo.c.a.c.Y 
The ''act of lobbying is, in general terms, an act 
of representation" in which interest groups and lobbyists 
are intermediaries between citizen concerns and govern-
ment.22 Tactics of advocacy are the ''specific actions taken 
to advance certain policy positions.''2J,24 
2 2 Jeffrey M. Berry, LobbYing_.foL.the .. P~oPle.: .... T.he 
P.o.1it.ica.LJl.ehi!v.i.or_.o;t.P.ub.1ic .. Inte:t:.esLGro\JPs , ( Prince ton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 5. 
23 Lester W. Milbrath, Public Opinion Quarterly, 
(Spring, 1960), reprinted in James Deakin, .T.h.e .. LobbYist, 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966), 41. 
2 4 Berry, 213. 
j 
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For the purposes of organization the different 
tactics of advocacy may be grouped into two general cate-
gories: direct and indirect, Figure 2. First, there are 
those tactics that are characterized by direct communication 
between lobbyists and governmental officials, most notably 
personal presentations and testimony before legislative 
committees. In the second group are those tactics which are 
indirect in nature and may be carried out by other persons 
in addition to the lobbyist. These tactics include the use 
of letters, telegrams, telephone calls, demonstrations or 
'actions, ' third party contacts, petitions, and the use of 
research results through the use of white papers. 25 
Figure 2: Tactics of Advocacy 
Direct Advocacy 
* Personal Communication 
* Testimony Before Legislative Committees 
Indirect Advocacy 
* Letters, Telegrams, Telephone Calls 
* Demonstrations 
* Third Party Contacts 
* Petitions 
* White Papers 
Fa.c .. e .. =.tR.= . .F.;;;c.e_ .. ~.Pnt.<;;.c.t .. s ....•.. Milbrath, in his classic 
study of lobbyists' preferences among the use of direct and 
indirect lobbying methods, found that 65 percent of the 
lobbyists preferred the direct method of the lobbyist's 
25Berry, 213-214. 
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personal presentation of arguments to legislators. On a 0-
10 scale the perceived effect of this contact for 58 percent 
of the lobbyists was a 10. Only 19 percent of the lobbyists 
rated it below 8 on the scale. The mean score for perceived 
effect on legislators for all lobbyists was 8. 43. Other 
findings by Milbrath in mean rank of perceived effectiveness 
were as follows: presentation of research findings to 
legislators, 7.40; testimony at legislative hearings, 6.55; 
contact of legislator by a district constituent, arranged by 
the lobbyist, 5.90; public relations campaigns, 5.55; letter 
and telegram campaigns, 4.54; contact of legislator by close 
friend of the legislator arranged by the lobbyist, 3. 76; 
publication of legislator's voting record, 2.05.26 
Similar findings were found by John F. Kennedy in 
his survey of a representative group of registered Washing-
ton lobbyists during his chairmanship of the Senate's 
Governmental Operations Committee. Kennedy found that from 
a prepared list of lobbying methods, lobbyists ranked direct 
contact with congressmen first, testimony before congres-
sional committees second, supply of printed matter to 
legislators' offices third, contact with organizations in 
the organization of issue campaigns fourth.27 
Berry notes that face-to-face contacts with 
legislative staff may be easier to arrange than with the 
26Milbrath, 184-185. 
2 7 James Deakin, The .. LotlbYis:t, (Washington: Public 
Affairs Press, 1978), 184. 
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legislator due to the demands on the legislator 1 s time. 
Berry further suggests that it is usually important to meet 
with the aide before trying to see the legislator.zs 
In California, the importance of the legislative 
aide cannot be overlooked. Jeffe reports that the numbers 
of professional staff working for legislators have increased 
steadily. "In 1965-66 an estimated 485 staffers served the 
California Legislature; by 1975-76 that number had risen to 
1172, and in 1985-86 it was 1610." The current role of the 
majority California legislative aides, Jeffe reports, 
combines both policy and politics, the development of 
legislation and the re-election and political advancement of 
the legislator.29 
Valuable corollaries noted in the research on 
direct communication tactics are the frequency with which 
lobbyists appear to concentrate on "friends," legislators 
favorable to their cause, and to shun offices where they 
think they may get a cold reception. "3 o Explanation given 
for this behavior is twofold: first 1 lobbyists are human 
and don 1 t wish to encounter hostility; second 1 by leaving 
legislators alone who do not support your cause, you do not 
2sBerry, 215. 
29 Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, "For Legislative Staff, Policy 






risk alienating them when on future issues they may be your 
allies.31 
Another school of thought in the issue of lobbying 
opponents is seen in the actions of lobbyists who ''openly 
criticize" legislative opponents with the intent that the 
criticism given will cause the opponent to "think twice 
about taking an adversary position the next time a policy 
conflict arises.''32 
Another refinement on the view to lobby only 
friends is the effort to persuade key ''swing'' legislators 
(those who are not confirmed hawks or doves, the fence 
sitters) to support a particular issue. Interest group 
lobbyists often target these legislators with indirect 
tactics, letters and calls and mount what legislators refer 
to as hit list campaigns.33 
Commi.t .. t .. li:l .. e ......... H.e .. a .. ring.s . In the hierarchy of the 
tactics of advocacy, the committee hearing is the tactic 
that dichotomizes the views and positions between lobbyists 
and legislators. "Legislators view the use of the hearing 
as a sacred institution.''34 Lobbyists think that ''testimony 
is a waste of time.''3S Even though lobbyists generally rate 
31 Berry, 218. 
· 3 2 Berry, 218. 
33Berry, 222. 
3 4 George Anderson and Everett Sentman, H.ow ... Xo\L .. Can 
.I.nfluli:lnGe .... Cong.r .. e .. S.s ... ; ........ T .. h .. e .. COIDPlet!Ol.HP-ndl;l.Ook ..... Jor ....... tn IOl ... C.i t i z e.n 
L.O.PPYi.st, (New York; E. P. Dutton, 1979), 272. 
35Berry, 223. 
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appearances at hearings as "not effective,'' it is, according 
to Berry, ''the most widely used tactic.''36 
While committee testimony may not have 
"substantive influence, it does seem to have symbolic value 
to legitimize efforts to influence legislation.'' 37 
Committee hearings do however reflect the "transference of 
legislation from the idea stage to the agenda stage where 
legislation is officially being considered, and for this 
reason is used by lobbyists to "go on the record."3a 
.L.e.t.t.e .. r..s..Ll'el_eg_ram.sl.l'.elePhon.e ........... G .. a.lls .. Legislators 
often report that the use of the indirect lobbying method of 
letters and telegrams has little influence on how they vote 
particularly when the "stacks of mail are easily recogniz-
able as resulting from organized campaigns. The letters and 
telegrams often use identical language and some canned 
arguments. To hear some legislators tell it, the letters 
are stacked in a closet and that's that.''39 
Anderson and Sentman report that letter writing 
campaigns and the use of "pressure mail are often deplored 
by legislators."40 Congressman Ottingner, in studying the 











two were from communi ties in his district. "It didn't 
represent a ground swell of opposition ... probably no more 
than a couple of dedicated opponents who talked their 
friends and neighbors into sending those letters. If we 
had gotten different letters from 250 people all over the 
district opposing the bill, it would have been a whole new 
ball game."41 
Not all legislators share the view that mail, an 
indirect lobbying method, has little value. "Wrong!" says 
former Congressman Jerome R. Waldie. ''There is no function 
more vital to a legislator than reading and replying to mail 
from home. A legislator's constituents are literally his 
life blood. If they are pleased with him they will support 
him in the next election. It is really that simple."42 
Letters can have several different kinds of impact 
on legislators' decisions. Anderson and Sentman list the 
following outcomes: "They can lead a legislator to take a 
position on a new issue, reverse a position already taken, 
and encourage renewed efforts. Letters also have a long 
range impact in shaping attitudes towards related issues."43 
An action is at best a 
vivid dramatization of an issue by supporters. Actions 
include picket lines, confrontations, marches and rallies,44 
41Anderson and Sentman, 51. 
42Anderson and Sentman, 41. 
4JAnderson and Sentman, 43. 
44Anderson and Sentman, 208. 
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Although interest group lobbies hold protests for many 
different reasons and in varying ways, the primary purpose 
is uniform: "to gain publicity for the cause. "45 Generally, 
the use of this tactic has three effects: first, press 
coverage of the action expands public awareness of the 
issue, which, secondly; makes officials more sensitive and 
knowledgeable about the issue; lastly, interest groups have 
~----------~t~h~e---e~x~p_e~c_t_a_t_~~·_o_n ___ t_h_a~t--~p~r~e~s~s ___ c~o~v~e~r~a~g~e~-s~t_r_e~n~g~t~h_·e~n~s ___ t~h~e-~_·r __________ ,1 
" leverage in the political process.46 
.'r.l:l.i.t::Q. ... Party_cQn.t .. a.c.t.s .. Use of influential third 
party contacts to gain access to legislators is a popular 
advocacy tactic. Its use increases when lobbyists are 
denied legislator access or when, in the interest of the 
cause, another individual is thought to be more effective or 
powerful in persuading the target to adopt the desired or 
wanted position. This tactic is also used in gaining 
access to the legislator's staff or aides.47 While there is 
no research on the views, attitudes, and perceptions of 
individuals who are, or arrange, third party contacts, it 
is reasonable to assume that such individuals do not want to 
wear out their welcome with their legislative friends, and 






P.etition. The petition, a collection of issue 
supporters' signatures, has little influence generally with 
legislators.49 According to Anderson and Sentman, "a 
petition conveys only the opinion of the person who first 
' i 
wrote the text, since it is supposedly easy to get people to -~ 
sign something on which they vaguely agree."so 
Po:;;i.t.ion ..... a.n.d ........ :W.hi.t.e ... !?apexl;l .. A position paper is, 
the arguments, stated calmly, of the principal evidence or 
authority for the views held by the lobbyist writer." These 
papers are usually two to four pages in length, set up with 
short paragraphs with sub-headings so that major points are 
easily read.s1 In contrast white papers are considerably 
longer and present in depth the background, analysis and 
support for an issue along with rebuttal of any opposition 
arguments. Generally, a list of issue supporters is 
included.s2 
The tactics of advocacy are those 
specific actions taken by interest groups and lobbyists to 
advance specific policy positions. The literature defines 
two major categories in the tactics of advocacy: direct and 
indirect. Direct advocacy tactics are face-to-face contacts 
,,.,,,_~MHHH-Uo••HOHH-OOnHOHOO-HO"O•••HOHoo•-HOOUOO"HOhoo"'HHno .. O•-U 
4 9 Anderson and Sentman, 206. 
so Anderson and Sentman, 52. 
51 Anderson and Sentman, 153. 
s 2Anderson and Sentman, 155. 
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with legislators and testimony at legislative committee 
hearings. Indirect advocacy includes the use of letters, 
telegrams, telephone calls, third party contacts, petitions 
and white papers. Indirect advocacy differs from direct 
advocacy in that the former can be carried out by persons in 
addition to the lobbyist. 
Studies conducted by Milbrath and Kennedy report 
that lobbyists prefer direct, face-to-face lobbying situa-
tions over legislative committee testimony. Berry reports 
that lobbyists consider committee testimony to be a waste of 
time, a view not held by legislators. Use of indirect 
I 
1 
tactics of advocacy appear to have mixed effect on 
legislators. 
Lobbyists appear to concentrate direct advocacy 
efforts on those legislators perceived to be friendly to the 
' 
lobbyist or to the lobbyist's issues. Indirect advocacy 
techniques are most often used by lobbyists for those 
legislators who appear neutral or split in their views 
regarding the lobbyist's goals. However, in the case of 
hostile or resistant legislators, lobbyists appear to use 
one of two methods: avoidance, so as not to alienate 
legislators who may be friendly toward other or future 
issues; or criticism, which is intended to shake a 
legislator's resolve to hold opposing views and opinions on 
issues important to the lobby. 
28 
s.t .. r .. a .. t.l;lgi.es.._ .. .o.Llnfluenc.e 
"Strategies of influence are the broad plans of 
attack" used in the political arena to gain or secure 
particular goals or objectives.sJ The four major strategies 
of influence are law, embarrassment and confrontation, 
information, and constituency influence and pressure. 54 
L.a.w. Use of the law as a strategy is viewed by 
some individuals as a way to work within the system without 
having to ''stoop to politics.••ss In this strategy "greater 
legitimacy is given to the court system" than to the 
legislative arena. In the view of many lobbyists use of the 
l 
courts is a "back-up strategy to use when all else fails."56 
.Em.b..a.r.r.a.s .. s.ment ......... an.d .... con.f .. r.ont.9.ti.on. The underlying 
premise of this strategy is that sufficient exposure of bad 
l policy will act to stimulate government officials to change 
such policy.s7 The more a group sees itself in an adversary 
position the more likely it is to have an untrusting view of 
governments and believe that it must force people in 
government to listen to its views through protests, news 
leaks, or whistle-blowing.ss 
53 Berry, 213. 
54 Berry, 212. 
55 Berry, 267. 
56 Berry, 267. 
57 Berry, 268. 







To expose a legislator in his district is to 
strike a sensitive nerve. In this philosophy, the more 
lobbyists and interest groups ''publicly denounce friends and 
enemies when they 'err, ' the more they [the lobbyists] 
strengthen their hand the next time around."59 
Groups that use this strategy base 
their efforts on the opinion that the government operates 
the way it does because of imperfect information. This 
philosophy encompasses a less hostile attitude toward 
government and the idea that people in government are 
generally open-minded. The information strategy is much 
more an inside strategy --one that depends on the "good will 
of sympathetic officials to fight for 'right' policies." 60 
Coi\.s .. t .. i .. t.u.e.ncY.._ .. rnflu.ence __ and.l'.res.sur.e. This strat-
egy is one of indirect influence in which lobbies act as 
catalysts to their active rank and file as well as to other 
influential individuals so that these individuals may lobby 
members of the legislature.61 
Summary: Strategies of influence differ from the 
tactics of advocacy in that the latter are specific actions 
keyed to particular legislators, and are generally carried 
out in a professional, non-hostile manner. Strategies of 
influence, however, are broad, far-reaching actions or 
attacks that may go beyond the focus of a single legislator 
59Berry, 222. 
soBerry, 269. 
6 1 Berry, 2 7 0 . 
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and may have aggressive or hostile overtones. These are the 
strategies of embarrassment and confrontation, and the use 
of organized constituency influence and pressure. The least 
hostile of the strategies of influence is the use of 
information campaigns. Another strategy of influence seeks 
redress of issues apart from the legislative arena by using 
the courts and the legal system to gain desired outcomes. 
~------------------------------------------------~ 
] 
A.dmini .. s .. tr.a.t.ive. .. Jn.t.e .. r.e.s .. L . .G.r.OJJ.Ps._.i . .n .... t.h.e._Poli .. t.i.c .. s ....... of ...... E.duc<!t.i.on 
School administrators as a profession are relative 
latecomers to the political scene. During the early 1900's 
and through the mid-fifties, the politics of education were 
described by Wood as "ideological politics," that is, a 
nonactive political position that viewed active participa-
tion in the process of political decision making as an 
unsuitable activity for professional school administra-
tors.62 Eliot reports that during this period many 
educators held the view that the ''politics of education were 
abhorrent."63 
Schmandt, Wendel and Manns in their analysis of 
school leaders state: "Leaders have shunned involvement 
more because of controversial issues confronting the school, 
and have used the separation principle as a convenient 
6 2 Robert C. Wood, SJ.<Purbi;;; (Boston: Little and Brown, 
1958) 1 192. 
63Thomas H. Eliot, "Toward an Understanding of Public 
School Politics." Americ<!!l .... P.oliti.c.<!l .. science. Review, LII I (December, 1959), 1023-42. 
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rationale for nonparticipation.''64 It is this ''apolitical'' 
stance of educators, particularly of school administrators, 
that California Assemblyman Dennis Mangers feels "is no 
longer possible" in light of the "sociopolitical context of 
today's schools.''65 
Campbell urges: 
Educators must adopt more sophisticated 
political techniques and operate in the 
mainstream of the states' power structure. 
1-----------------'!'rh-9-f-U-tUX-9----q-U-a-1-i-t-y-G-f-t-l:l-e-p-tJ.-b-l-i-G------S-G-l:l-GG-J..-s-m-ajJ'-------i 
well depend on how accurately educators per-
1 
" I 
ceive and how efficiently they participate 
in the political arena.66 
Geske indicates that "administrators have some 
obligation to bring new insights to the problems of state 
politics particularly to the areas of supervision, financial 
support, and accountability.''67 Kapel and Pink also rein-
force the position that ''professionals have every obligation 
and right to influence policy and supply valid information 
64Henry J. Schmandt, George Dorian Wendel and John T. 
Manns, ''Government, Politics and the Public Schools: A 
Preliminary study of Three Cities," .I.ntegrateducation, XVII 
(May, 1978), 20. 
65Dennis Mangers, "Need for Administrator Training 
Voiced by Legislative Task Force," l'hrustforEducational 
Leadersh.iP, VI II (March, 19 7 9 ) , 5 . 
66Roald F. Campbell, ''The State and the Professor: 
(paper presented at the 29th Annual National Conference of 
Professors of Educational Administration, Bozeman, Montana, 
August 17, 1975), citedbyTerryG. Geske, "State 
Educational Policy Making: A Changing Scene,'' 
.Mmini.strators .. Notebo.ok, XXVI ( 19 7 8 ) n. p. 
67 Geske, ''State Educational Policy Making: A Changing 
Scene," Administrators' Notebook, XXVI, (1978), n.p. · 
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and arguments. "6 a They further report that the action of 
politically vested interest groups is a legitimate avenue 
for the expression of particularistic views.69 
While school administrators as a profession have 
been previously described as being relative late comers to 
the political scene, educational politics in the Golden 
State does include some notable exceptions and some notable 
-
~ 
~-----------s_c_h_o __ o_l_m_e_n __ . ___ B_o_w __ l_e_s __ ~_·n ___ h_i_s ___ a_n_a_l~y~s-~_·_s __ o_f ___ e_d_u_c_a_t_~_·o_n _ a_l~p~r_e __ s_s_u_r_e _________ 
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I 
groups and the California Legislature observed that with the 
selection of the first State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction in 1849 and continuing for the next 25 years, 
all proposed education legislation, both governance and 
finance was the individual domain of the State Superin-
tendent. He not only developed the legislation, he 
presented it to the legislature and personally 
''shepherd(ed) it through the legislature to adoption.70 
In 1875 ''in Sacramento just prior to the Constitu-
tional Convention'' the California Teachers Association held 
its first business meeting.71 This event is significant in 
that almost from the moment of conception of this interest 
sen. E. Kapel and w. T. Pink, 
Participatory Democracy Revisited,'' 
(Spring, 1978), 26. 
69Kapel and Pink, 26. 
"Schoolboard: 
I.!r!:lan .. R<lview, x 
7°Brinton Dean Bowles, "Educational Pressure Groups and 
the Legislative Process in California, 1945-1966" (Ph.D. 




group, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction began 
to carry legislation to the legislature at the request of 
the Association. Bowles states that until the turn of the 
century the "history of the California Teachers Association 
and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction is one 
and the same."72 
This collaborative effort between the interest 
group and the Office of the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction is significant because even though the name of 
the interest group was the California Teachers Association, 
its leadership was, in fact, comprised of school 
administrators. This administrative leadership of the 
Association remained in control through the 1960's. "The 
lobby was an interlocking directorate of city, county, and 
district superintendents in effective political control of 
the California Teachers Association as well as their own 
incipient organizations.''73 Illustration of this point is 
seen in the 1927 dual role of school administrator Mark 
j Keppel when he served as Legislative Chairman of both the California Teachers Association and the State 
Superintendents' Association.74 
Through the 1930's the unified administrative 
lobby under the banner of the California Teachers Associa-
tion was, for the most part 1 successful in obtaining a 
7 2 Bowles 1 7 3. 
73Bowles 1 92. 
7 4 Bowles, 9 3. 
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number of historic and valuable pieces of educational 
legislation. However, the political alliance in 1920 
between the California Teachers Association and the Masons, 
which secured the passage of Constitutional Initiative 16 
for school funding, led to the rise of organized opposition 
to meet what the press of the time called the "all powerful" 
school lobby.7s The opposition which began in 1921 carne in 
the form of the California Taxation Improvement Association, 
and included the membership of big business and the public 
utili ties. 7 6 Later this anti-education lobby group was 
joined by the Southern Pacific Railroad and the Pacific Gas 
and Electric Cornpany-77 
Ten years later interest group lobby alliances 
changed and the California Teachers Association became the 
ally of the California Realtors Association and the Cali-
fornia Farm Bureau Federation in support of Proposition 9, 
an effort to increase school funding through the shift of 
tax revenues from a.\l .. _Y<!l.o.r.em tax to income and/or sales tax. 
In this drive for electorate support, the California 
Teachers Association was the "heaviest single contributor". 
The campaign was defeated.78 
75Bowles, 87. 
76Known at the present time as the California 
Taxpayers' Association. 





While under administrative leadership control the 
California Teachers Association in 1931 affiliated a class-
room teacher division. This was a move which would 
ironically come full circle in 1975, when the California 
Teachers Association removed the rights of membership to 
school administrators. Administrative control of the CTA 
continued through the Depression and World War II to the 
1960's. Bowles provides this insightful anonymous qu=o.,.t.,.e ____ ~, 
" ~ 
obtained through a personal interview with an influential 
superintendent of the period: 
CTA! There was no problem! We were 
CTA. CTA was controlled by superintendents 
of schools, local schools. All of the 
officers were superintendents.79 
It is important to note that during the post war 
period, 1945-52, a small "tightly knit group of school 
superintendents,'' identified by Bowles as 'prestige 
superintendents' initiated and controlled twenty out of 
twenty-two pieces of legislation, as well as the Governor's 
appointment of an interim State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. In each of these issues the prestige superin-
tendents communicated directly with the Assembly, Senate, 
and the Governor and by-passed the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction. Additionally, the prestige superin-
tendents used the offices of the Parent-Teachers Association 
to lobby for these issues, and encouraged school trustees 
79Bowles, 121. 
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throughout the State to form the California School Boards 
Association.so,sl 
If the first hundred years of California adminis-
trative involvement in the politics of education was 
monolithic and tied primarily to superintendent control of 
the California Teachers Association, the first thirty eight 
years of the second century can best be described as 






trative involvement in the politics of education is still 
being written, · a number of observations can be made about 
the forces which have come into play since 1950 and which 
operate in the current political environment. 
One of the factors operating in the mid-fifties 
was the belief of the Governor and certain members of the 
legislature that "the CTA-administrator alliance ... had to 
be upset."B2 To this end various actions were taken which, 
through the intervening years, helped to reduce and divide 
the unitary control of the administrative education lobby. 
These political actions included: 
1. The development of educational 'experts' within 
the membership of the legislature who are 
knowledgeable about schools and their needs. 
soBowles, 185-201. 
B1The prestige superintendents identified during this 
period refers to School Superintendents Saxon, Crawford, 
Warren, Kiersey, Howell, Carroll, Helms, Bachrodt, 
Trillingham, Seidell, Odell and Brady, all superintendents 
of the state's largest districts. 







2. The organization and development of education 
legislation by individual members of both the 
Assembly and Senate as well as by the Governor. 
3 0 The appointment of lay 
to review and recommend 
legislature.s3 
citizen advisory boards 
educational changes to the 
Also operating in the current competitive period 
are a number of forces in the political climate, which in 
conjunction with the three political actions described 
above, have further complicated administrators' efforts in 
the legislative arena. These major forces are: the 
fractionalization of the education lobby, the continued rise 
of non-education interest groups, the development of big 
business lobbying firms, the use of shadow lobbyists, the 
expulsion of administrators from the California Teachers 
Association, and the formation of the Association of 
California School Administrators. 
F_,;:a<;;.t.ion.al.i .. z .. a .. t.i.on .. _ .... of ........... th.e ...... -.E.Q.ucat.i .. on ....... t.oPPY . As 
competing legislation was introduced by the legislature, 
differences began to occur among the educational leadership 
due in part to urban-rural differences, economic pressures, 
and student population increases. In addition other 
administrative organizations and specialized educational 
interest groups began to develop their own unique political 
agendas and their membership and power bases. a 4 • as Most 
eJBowles, 203-335. 
B4Bowles, 203-335. 
B 5 Statement by Ferd J. Kiesel, personal interview, San 
Mateo, California, August, 1987. 
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notable during the SO's and 60's was the Urban School 
Association, the Small Schools Association, the Elementary 
Principals Association, the Secondary Principals 
Association, the Association for School Curriculum 
Development, and the County Superintendents of Schools 
Association.s& 
At the present time, thirty four separate public 
~-----------s~c_h_o_o_l ___ 1_·n __ t_e_r_e_s_t __ ~g_r_o_u~p~s ____ h_a_v_e ____ r_e~g~1_·s_t _ e_r_e_d ___ w __ i_t_h ___ t_h __ e___ F_a_i_r _________ 
11 
Political Practices Commission. Some of these interest 
groups represent particular legislative concerns such as the 
Association of Low Wealth Schools, the Association of Large 
Suburban School Districts, the California Association of 
I 
l Compensatory Education, the Coalition for Adequate School Housing and the Special Education Mandate for Full Funding 
l Association. 
Other educational interest groups are organized 
according to the interest of specialized groups of 
educators. These groups include the California Association 
l of School Psychologists, the California Agricultural Teachers Association, the California Association of Teachers 
J 
of English to Speakers of Other Languages and the California 
School Nurses Association. 
The third group of educational interests are those 
groups which have as their primary focus the protection of a 
particular segment of the education profession such as the 
California Teachers Association, and the California School 
B 6 Kiesel. 
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Employees Association. The California Teachers Association 
has for the past five years maintained the largest number of 
registered lobbyists. The current number of lobbyists, 
seven, exceeds the number of lobbyists for any other 
interest group registered with the Secretary of State.a7 
T.l:J..e ... -- .. Gon.t .. i.nued ___ .. Jl . .i .. s .. e .. of ___ Non.:: .. e.d.u.c..a.ti.on .......... J.nt.er.e.:;;.t 
The increase in the number, size and financial 
resources of non-education interest groups in competition 
------------------------------~~----~---------:~ 
with educational interests within the legislative arena 
remains in the current period, a political fact. According 
to Zeiger in the California Journal "the number of groups 
and firms employing paid persuaders has tripled within the 
past ten years." Currently 1695 organizations have some 
form of representation in Sacramento. The amount spent on 
lobbying in 1985-86 is estimated to be in excess of 144 
million dollars. In 197 5 only $20 million was spent on 
lobbying activities.aa 
It has been commonly said that 'money is the 
mothers' milk of politics.' With the figures reported above 
it is important to clarify that the amount shown, $144 _ 
million, includes not only the costs associated with direct 
lobbying, but additionally, those funds given by lobbyists, 
and/or interest groups for legislator re-election campaigns. 
B7Please see Appendix G for the complete list of 
California education groups employing registered lobbyists. 
BBRichard Zeiger, ''The Persuaders: Lobbying ... An Art 
Form Flourishing in Sacramento," Gali.f.o.rnia ..... Journq,l XII I 




Zeiger observes that the growth of lobbying is directly 
proportional to the growth of the state budget which has 
also tripled in the past ten years.s9 
The question arises, .who are the most powerful 
lobbies within the state of California? The answer to the 
question based upon the investigator's review of the 
literature appears, at the present time, to be inconclusive. 
This inconclusiveness seems to based on a number of factors, 
factors which give rise to a series of interrelated issues. 
First, there is little consensus regarding the 
definition of 'powerful.' Is power a measure of lobby group 
size, the amount of money spent to obtain particular goals 
and objectives, or is power defined by the degree of 
legislative attainments? Second, what measurable and 
equitable standard can be used to quantify the lobbying 
efforts between and among the broad spectrum of interest 
groups who have diverse and competing aims and purposes? 
Lastly, who should determine an interest group's power 
index? Can power be determined by the membership of an 
interest group, or is power awarded to an interest group 
through the evaluations and perceptions of others? If the 
latter is the case, who are these 'others?' Are they 
members of similar interest groups, the members of 
adversarial interest groups, governmental officials, or are 
they non-judgmental, non-interested, neutral third parties? 
While there is no clear resolution to these interrelated 
B9Zeiger, 71. 
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issues, these questions are helpful in illustrating the 
complexity of the current California political scene.9o 
T.h.e ....... R.i.s .. e ......... o.L . .?.;r;:ofe.s .. s .. i.on.a.l.Lo!;lbyin.g .... F .. i .. rms .. Jervis 
and Fairbanks state that the "trend toward the creation of 
lobbying firms resulted from the realization among interest 
groups and lobby clients that grass-roots support, good 
press relations and other such services are necessary parts 
of getting what they want, and that the solo lobbvi~t_cBnno~------~~ 
cover those fields.''91 
In 1987 California lobbyist firms are big 
business. Based upon reported records compiled by the Fair 
Political Practices Commission. the largest lobbying firm 
both in terms of reported income ($2,424,249.00 for 1983-84) 
and number of employed, registered lobbyists ( 5) was A-K 
Associates. The firm represents 25 clients, among whom are 
the Golden Gate Bridge Transportation District, the Tobacco 
Institute, the City of South Lake Tahoe, the Association of 
Home Appliance Manufacturers, the Unitary Tax Campaign, and 
the California Association of Large Urban School 
Districts.92 This diversity of client and/or interest group -
representation is also seen in those lobbyist firms that 
specialize in representing educational interest groups such 
90Please see data presented in Chapter 4. 
91John Jervis and Robert Fairbanks, ''Lobbyists: A New 
Symphony of Service," CaliJo.J::nia. Journal XII (February, 
1985) 1 46. 
92Ellen Chapman and Richard Zeiger, ''Influencing 
Government for Fun and Profit," .CaliJo:rniaJournal XIII 
(February, 1986), 74. 
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as school districts, or educational associations devoted to 
a particular issue, or focus.93 
!Js ... !iLo.f ....... S ..bad.ox.: .... LoPPYillt.s. The most recent addition 
to the California political scene in the past two years is 
the use of shadow lobbyists. Individuals who are hired by 
lobbying firms as interns or ''staff specialists'' yet 
"perform the same tasks as full-time, registered lobbyists." 
~----------C:r~e==a~g~e:r~r~e~p~o~r~t~s~~t=h=a~t~a=s~m~a~n~y~~a=s~s=i=x~o~u~t=-o~f~t~e~n~b~i~g~~l~o~b~b~y~i~n~g ________ i~ 
firms use unregistered lobbyists as do a large number of law 
firms who serve clients with everything from legislative 
analysis to active advocacy. This gray area of the law is 
also used by "many small public interest associations 
who see themselves as a separate breed from the 'big money' 
lobbyists."94 
.E.xPul~> .. ion ....... _ ..... o ..f .... - ......... A .. d.m.i.n.i.ll .. t.r.ator ..ll ............... :fr.om .............. C<;!.l.i :forn.i.a 
The impetus for the removal of 
administrators from membership in the California Teachers 
Association came from two sources, the increasing militancy 
of teachers during the 1960's and 70's, and establishment of 
collective bargaining in 1975. Scheidt describes the 
teachers' attainment of collective bargaining rights as one 
93Please see Appendices F,G,H for school districts, 
county offices of education and educational interest groups 
employing registered lobbyists or lobbyist firms. 
94Creager, 103-104. 
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of the biggest political "shocks of the past decade 
administrators shook."95 
With the arrival of collective bargaining came a 
growing concern on the part of teachers that administrators 
had become part of the opposition as management team members 
in the bargaining process. The first move to restrict 
administrators in the Association was a move in 1975 to 
prohibit administrators from positions on the CTA State " 
~----~------------------~----------------------
Board of Directors. Within some CTA chapters, efforts were 
made to remove administrators from local charter membership. 
The issue regarding administrators continued and in May 1976 
the CTA Representative Assembly passed a resolution limiting 
Association membership to teachers. The current definition 
of Association members is: ''Active membership shall be open 
to any person engaged in non-administrative non-supervisory 
professional education work."96,97,9B 
F.o.rma.t.ion ...... o.LJ;he._ ... A.ss.o.ci.a.t.i.on_._of __ caliJorn.i.a ..... Sc:.h.ool 
The division and separation of various 
administrative interest groups remained in effect until May, 
1970 when seven California administrative organizations 
9SBruce Scheidt, "Teacher Unions: Marriage or Mayhem," 
C<!.li;[P.rni<! ___ J:ourn<!l XIV (July, 1987), 328. 
96Kiesel. 
9
'California Teachers Association, BYl<!ws, Article III, 
Section 3, Paragraph A., Adopted May 1975, Amended May, 
1976, June, 1980 and October, 1982. 
9BAcknowledgement is made to Dean Chandler, Records 
Center Specialist, California Teachers Association for his 
gracious assistance in obtaining Association information. 
~ 
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cooperatively formed the Association of California School 
Administrators, ACSA. The professional organizations 
present at the ACSA Constitutional Convention were: the 
California Elementary School Administrators, the California 
Association of Supervision and Curriculum Development, the 
California Association of Adult Education Administrators, 
the California Association of Secondary School 






the California Association of County Superintendents, and 
the California Association of School Administrators. 99 
Fifteen years later ACSA has 15,190 dues paying members who 
represent all branches and levels of school 
administration.loo 
At the present time ACSA maintains, in addition to 
its main office in Burlingame, California, a Sacramento 
legislative office. Here three full-time, registered 
lobbyists are employed on behalf of the ACSA organiza-
tion.1o1 
Summerfield, in his descriptive analysis of the 
lobbyist function, states: 
99Association of California School Administrators. 
Proceeding~ __ of ... t.he __ con~_t..itut io_nal. __ c_onv.en.t .. i .. o.n ..•..... 2 ... 3 ...... M.a.Y ..... to .. 2 4. 
May_, ____ l,g]o_, ___ r.erd_._,;r, ___ Kiesel_, __ cha.irm.an (Burlingame: CTA 
Building). 
1oostatement by Vivian Fenders, ACSA Membership Data 
Clerk, personal interview, Burlingame, California, January, 
1987. 
1o1statement by Gordon H. Winton, ACSA Lobbyist, 
personal interview, Sacramento, California, May, 1979. 
Verification by Ray E. curry, ACSA, Assistant Executive 





The lobbyist's main work is to link his 
group's aspiration with the action of offi-
cial decision makers. The linkage involves 
the necessity for the lobbyist to stay in-
formed on several fronts. He must know the 
position of his own organization, the status 
of every legislative idea relevant to his 
organization, the positions and leanings of 
all relevant government officials, as well 
as other lobbies and interests, and the de-
tailed facts of pending legislation.1o2 
In these ways the ACSA lobbyists promote three 
favorable consideration of laws, regulations, and interpre-
tations that will confer some kind of positive benefit to 
education. At other times the lobbyists will secure 
protection against those laws and regulations which can do 
harm to some segment of education. Lastly, lobbyists try to 
secure forms of personal and professional respectability and 
economic recognition for the ACSA membership.10J 
Currently ACSA maintains four discernible linkage 
networks. The first two networks are composed of eighteen 
regional legislative and legislative action committees. 
These committees, based on input from area constituencies, 
provide the ACSA State Legislative Council and lobbyists 
with support and demands from administrators in the field. 
1 o 2 Harry L. Summerfield, ?9Wer .... and ?r ..ocess: .......... 'rhe. 
E.o.r.mu.la.t ... i .. on ....... an.d ....... L.i.mits of .... F.e.de . :.a.l .. _.E .. d.uca.t.i .. onal .... J'ol.i .. cY (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), 16. 
10 3 stephen K. Bailey, E.d.uc.a.tion.!nterest.GrouPs ..... i.n ..... th.e. 
Nation.~ .. s-... Ca.P .. it ..a.l (Washington: American Council on 
Education, 1975), 30-36. 
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The third network is an informal communication 
forum called the 'Tuesday Night Group' which meets every 
Tuesday in the Los Angeles Unified School District's 
lobbyist's office. Generally eighteen to twenty-two 
representatives from other interest groups and lobbies 
attend. During the 1986 legislative session, the 'Tuesday 
Night Group' included: legislative staff members of the 
f-----------~C~a~l~~~·~f~o~r~n~i~a:_A~s~s~e~m~b~l~y~~a~n~d~/~o~r~~S~e~n~a~t~e~,~r~e~p~r~e~s~e~n~t~a~t~~~·v~e~s~f~r~o~m~~t~h~e~-------1 
" California State Department of Education, the California 
Congress of Parents and Teachers, the California School 
Boards Association, the California Teachers Association, the 
American Federation of Teachers, the State Classified 
Employee Union, the League of Women Voters, and the 
California Taxpayers Association.1o4 Based on the 
observations of Wirt and Kirst it seems apparent that the 
ACSA informal forum has established a coalition similar to 
the ''National Big Six,'' a linking of professional and lay 
groups. The "National Big Six" includes: the American 
Association of School Administrators, the National Education 
Association, the Council of Chief State School Officers, the 
National School Boards Association, the National Association 
of State School Boards and the National Congress of Parents 
and Teachers.1os 
1D4Winton and Curry. 
1DsFrederick M. Wirt and Michael w. Kirst, Po1iticaJ. 
anO. .... s.o.ci.;;.l ..... F. . .o .. undil.ti9!l.s ..... 9f ...... E;P.uc.at.i9n (Berkeley: Mccutchan 





The fourth linkage system used by ACSA is the 
Sacramento Education Legislative Letter (SELL), a legisla-
tive digest and news brief included in the weekly ACSA news-
paper. SELL is sent to the entire ACSA membership in an 
effort to keep members informed on new legislation and the 
status of pending legislation.lo6 
S.umm.a .. r.Y.; Until the 1970's, school administrators 
as a profession were generally not involved in the politics , ~--~~~~~~~==~~~~~~==~----~, 
of education due to the commonly held philosophy that 
political involvement as well as speaking out on 
controversial issues was unsuitable and unseemly for 
professional school administrators. Since the 1970's, 
administrators have been urged by educational scholars, 
1 
Campbell, Geske, Kopel and Pink and by legislators, such as 
Mangers, to become involved in the politics of education as 
I a right and as a responsibility of the administrative role. 
The history of administrators' involvement in the 
politics of education within California has evolved from 
three major periods: Individual control by the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1849-1875; Collabora-
;;;; 
tion between the Office of the State Superintendent of ~ 
Public Instruction and the administrator dominated, 
California Teachers Association, 1875-1960; The modern or 
current period of administrator involvement in the politics 
of education has been described as competitive due to a 
number of interactive forces: The rise of legislative 
106Winton and Curry. 
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experts, lay citizen advisory boards, the fractionalization 
of the education lobby, the continued rise of non-education 
interest groups and growth of professional lobbying firms, 
the use of shadow lobbyists, and the removal of 
administrators from the California Teachers Association. 
The largest administrative organization in the 
State of California, the Association of California School 
administrative groups. ACSA currently maintains three full-
time Sacramento lobbyists, and four legislative linkage 
networks, eighteen legislative committees and eighteen 
legislative action committees, the Tuesday Night Group, and 
the Sacramento Education Legislative Letter . 
. Superixl.t.en9.ents_~ ............ l:i.ei';l9.e:t::ship _____ Rol..e .. ______ i __ n ______ th.e .......... ?.o.l . .i.t.i .. cs ............ of 
.E.9..u.ci';\.t.ion 
One of the earliest and most comprehensive studies 
reported in the literature regarding the political activity 
of school superintendents is Beavers' comparative 
investigation of state legislators' and superintendents' 
perceptions of the superintendent's role. The results of 
the study indicate five major conclusions: 
1. School superintendents do not understand the 
political climate in the same way that the 
legislators perceive the political climata. 
2. The superintendents and legislators are not in 
agreement on their perceptions of the 
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superintendent's level of expertise in educational 
matters. 
3. The superintendents and legislators concurred 
[that] what the superintendent is actually doing 
[is] to promote educational legislation for the 
benefits of the children involved. 
4. Both respondent groups, legislators and superin-
tendents, agreed that in the majority of items 
surveyed, the ideal role [of the superintendent] 
was perceived in much the same manner. 
5. Responses of legislators indicated that for a 
school superintendent to be influential in state 
level educational decision making, the following 
should be done: 
a. Understand the political process. 
b. Make use of the political process. 
c. Keep well-informed on all political issues. 
d. Present educational concerns to the legislator 
in person. 
e. Telephone the state legislator to present 
educational concerns. 
f. Write the state legislator to present educa-
tional concerns. 
g. Ask state 
and large 
legislation. 
legislators to appear before small 
groups to discuss educational 
h. Meet with state legislators and others to 
formulate educational legislation. 
i. Support candidates for political office who 
favor educational legislation. 
50 
j. Accept appointments on committees to study 
educational needs. 
k. Maintain a knowledge 
tion as it relates 
district. 
of educational legisla-
te the local school 
1. Cooperate in long-range statewide legislative 
educational planning·107 
Billy I in his investigation of Minnesota 
superintendents' political involvement in the state level 




political lobbying and campaigning behavior of 
superintendents with respect to three variables: 
1. Metropolitan versus outstate districts; 
2. District characteristics: geographical location, 
financial condition, size, enrollment trends, 
constituent composition; 
3. Personal characteristics of the superintendents: 
age, tenure, training and experience. 
Billy concluded that the "unanimity in the lack of involve-
ment in some activities, such as campaigning, and the 
substantial activity in others, such as lobbying, implies 
that political involvement may be a consequence of the 
position rather than personal or district 
characteristics."10B 
107Ramey LeRoy Beavers, "The Local School 
Superintendent's Political Role in State Level Educational 
Decision Making as Perceived by Superintendents and State 
Legislators," P.issertation.l\.l:lstracts JnternationP.l ( P.O.I) 3 9 
(1979): 5218-A. Mississippi State University. 
10BTheodore Billy, "The Political Involvement of 
Minnesota Superintendents in the State Level Policy Making 





In the statewide analysis of the political 
activity of Texas superintendents at system, community and 
state levels, Eason indicated that the size of the school 
district has no effect on a superintendent's actual and 
desired political activity. At all three levels 
superintendents "desired more involvement in decision making 
processes." Eason, like Beavers, suggests that the high 
of the interest superintendents have about political 
activity at all levels.109 
Bane, in his comparative, though limited, study of 
administrator and school board perceptions of administrator 
participation in political activities in eight California 
unified school districts, found agreement in the mutual view 
that administrators "should participate in political 
activities both personally and as members of professional 
organizations" and that this participation was "necessary." 
Administrators, however, saw a greater leadership role for 
themselves in political activity than the role ascribed and 
expected of them by board members. As a consequence of this 
disparity in views there is a ''need for administrators and 
boards to define the administrative role with respect to 
political activity so that mutual expectations may be 
achieved.'' Administrators are further cautioned that their 
109Ella Rose Eason, ''The Political Activity of Texas 
Public School Superintendents at the Public School System, 
Community, and State Levels," .D.Al 43 (1983): 3479-A. East 




"participation in political activity is at some risk. 
Political activity should not jeopardize their relationship 
with their employers, and their actions should enhance the 
position of their school district and benefit the students 
in their schools.''110 
Case and King in their investigation of New Mexico 
superintendents as lobbyists report that "superintendents' 
political involvement at the state level is not consistent ~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~ 
The behavior of active superintendents is clearly different 
from inactive superintendents.''111 The active superinten-
dents "avail themselves of greatly varying degrees of 
involvement, that they are permitted such latitude for 
maneuverability by communities or boards, and are more 
sensitive to varying political behaviors." 112 In the 
active superintendents' view, "Superintendents have to be 
political to survive and to get what is coming to their 
district. We are at the mercy of the legislature. You have 
to work for it." 113 Less politically active superinten-
110Robert M. Bane, ''Perceptions of Educational 
Administrators and School Board Members Regarding the 
Participation of Administrators in Political Activities," 
PAJ 43 (1983): 3760-A University of Southern California. 
111Elizabeth J. Case and Richard A. King. ''Influencing 
State Fiscal Policy Making: The Superintendent as Lobbyist.'' 
Paper presented at the Annual Meetir.g of the American 





dents report it is "inappropriate to talk to politicians in 
the community" or to "go chasing off to Santa Fe."ll4 
In the comparison of superintendent and legislator 
perceptions of superintendents' political involvement, 
"legislators report superintendents to be more highly 
involved in the political arena than do the superintendents 
themselves."llS 
"These active superi_n~den-ts--t.ead--t-c-----
i---------------~ro=J:y---less upon professional associations to 
represent their views in the capitol, and 
exhibit a high degree of individual 
political involvement. Less active 
superintendents tend to contact directly 
only to oppose pending bills; more active 
superintendents maintain linkages, making 
frequent contacts throughout the year to 
propose and react to possible 
legislation.ll6 
SummilrY. .. :.. Superintendents' involvement in lobbying 
activities with legislators appears not to be related to 
district size, geographical location (metropolitan versus 
rural), constituency of students, or the personal 
characteristics of the superintendent. The difference 
between politically active superintendents and non-active 
superintendents appears to be the result of differing 
philosophies and perceptions regarding the role of the 
superintendent. Active superintendents tend to believe that 
they have to be legislatively proactive for their districts, 





'it's inappropriate and unseemly to be involved in 
politics, ' view of the pre-1970's. Active superintendents 
also seem to be more sensitive to the political behavior of 
legislators and rely less on associational lobbying than on 
their own lobbying efforts. These superintendents also 
appear to have more board support for their lobbying 
activities. 
Superintendents nationally appear to be in 
transition from a non-active to a pro-active legislative 
lobbying philosophy. More superintendents seem to desire 
involvement in lobbying or have expressed interests in this 
area. 
Recommendations for superintendent lobbyists 
include: understanding and using the political process; 
keeping informed about legislation; using direct and 
indirect lobbying techniques with legislators; and defining 
the superintendents' lobbying role with the board of 
education. 
""" Zeigler and Johnson, in their four state study of ~
legislators' interaction and linkages with education lobby-
ists, found that legislators who are most favorable to 
education lobbyists tend to hold legislative leadership 
positions, have a high rate of interaction with lobbyists, 
and are generally state senators as opposed to representa-
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tives or assemblymen,117 When asked about the type of 
interaction most preferred, legislators indicated that 
"formal committee meetings or appointments with lobbyists" 
was their first choice as a means of channeling 
interactional contacts.11s 
Zeigler, in an earlier study, reported that when 
legislators and educational lobbyists were asked to rate the 
number of legislator-lobbyist interactions per week, the 
lobbyists indicated that their number of interactions was 
higher than the number of interactions perceived by legisla-
tors. Additionally, lobbyists saw themselves in a persuader 
role while the legislators viewed them as informants ,119 
Interestingly, Kelly, in his work on public policy, 
indicated that legislators viewed themselves as no longer 
dependent on educational lobbies due to the increased 
legislative staff capabilities of modern state 
legislatures. 
Based on a legislator survey, Wahlke defines the 
'typology of legislators' role orientation toward pressure 
11 7 Harmon Zeigler and Karl F. Johnson, Politic<L.Of 
EQ..u~<at.ion .. in .... the .. St.<ates (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill com-
pany, Inc., 1972}, 150-158. 
11Bzeigler and Johnson, 130. 
119 Harmon Zeigler, "The Effects of Lobbying: A 
Comparative Assessment," P..ublicO:Pinio.n.anQ.Public PolicY: 
Mo.Q.els .... of .... 1' .. o.Jitical .... L.inkage, ed. Norman R. Luttbeg 
(Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1968}, 313. 
12DJames A. Kelly, "Public Policy Context of 
Educational Finance," AQ.m.inis.tr<at0 rs ..... Notebook, XXVI (1978}, 
n.p. 
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groups. These legislator roles may be defined in the 
following ways: 
"' 'l' t t . 
.'C .. a.c .. 1 ... 1 ....... a .... or~> a friendly attitude toward the group 
and knowledgeable about its program. 
a hostile attitude toward the group and 
knowledgeable about its program . 
.N.e.!J.t.r.al.s.: no strong attitude or no knowledge of the 
desired program.121 
The effectiveness of educational interest groups 
as perceived by the Wisconsin legislature, was found by 
Shepro to have significant differences with respect to 
interest group influence on individual legislators, the 
entire legislature, and three types of legislation. 
Additionally, these differences existed between Republican 
and Democratic legislators. No significant differences in 
perceptions were observed for legislators of different 
geographic regions of residence, sex or occupation.122 
The impact or ultimate effect of educational 
interest group effort is dramatically revealed in Anderson's 
1983 study of the 'Politics of Persistence'. A case study 
design using four questions traced the development of 
tuition tax statutes for elementary and secondary education 
121John C. Wahlke, ''The Legislator and the Interest: 
Pressure Group Roles," Th .. e ..... LegiJ>l.at.ive ....... S.Ys.tem.: ..... Ex:: 
P.lorations ... ..in. LegisJ.a!ive ... Ilellavio..:t:, ed. John c. Wahlke and 
Heinz Eulau (New York: John Willey, 1972), p 311-342. 
122Thomas Joseph Shepro, ''The Perceived Effectiveness 
of Four Education Interest Groups upon the 1981 Wisconsin 
Legislature," .PAl. 44 (1983): 1284-A. University of 
Wisconsin. 
----~ 
in the State of Minnesota. The questions were: 
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( 1) Who 
were the major actors? (2) How did these actors influence 
the legislative process? (3) What effect did their actions 
have on policy? {4) What factors account for the adoption 
of tuition tax measures?123 
Based on thirty-nine informal and thirty-three 
in-depth interviews, Anderson reported that "the power of a 
single issue interest group alliance,'' the Minnesota ~ 
~----~----------~~~~~--~~-----~ 
Catholic Conference and Citizens for Educational Freedom, 
''was the critical factor affecting the legislative process 
... The alliance also overcame token resistance from a 
fragmented public school lobby." Anderson concluded that 
there is a "need for further research on the nature of 
education interest groups and the use of power in legisla-
tive decision making."124 
Legislators' attitudes towards educational lobby-
ists in New Mexico indicated a preference for individual 
contacts by superintendents as opposed to organizational or 
network lobbying efforts. Legislators tend to believe that 
when groups of individuals say the same thing on the same 




44 (1984): 3214-A. 
1 2 4 Anderson. 
Anderson, "Politics of Persistence: 
Resulting in Minnesota's Tuition Tax 
for Elementary-Secondary Education," 




was not what the superintendents thought --it was what the 
directors of the association wanted.''125 
Gibbons, in her definitive investigation of Wash-
ington State legislator preferences in their sources of 
information for educational issues, found that the preferred 
rank order of information was first for expert, followed by 
legal, then friendship sources. In decision making, 
legislators preferred an analysis of issues over bar ainin_g, ____ ,. 
strategies. Additionally, legislators favored contacts with 
inside referents, those individuals known to the 
legislators, over contacts by outside referents.126 
A similar study conducted by Gemar, with Califor-
nia legislators from four legislative committees, found that 
"regardless of issue," legislators viewed expertise as a 
valuable resource. While three committees utilized 
resources found within the legislature, only the Assembly 
Education Committee turned to outside reference groups. In 
all committees, legislators identified with inside analysis 
and bargaining as the decision preference mechanisms. Gemar 
concluded that there is a "need for increased involvement 
12scase, 10. 
126 Dolores Jean Gibbons, "Legislative Decision Making: 
Factors that Influence Educational Issues," PAI 45 (1985): 
3495-A. Washington State University. 
~ 
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and understanding of the legislative process by educational 
leaders."127 
Contrasting findings were reported by Krepel in 
his national, random sample of state legislators regarding 
preferences for pre-decision information. In this study, 
Krepel reported that as legislation increases in complexity, 
that is, in use of technical terminology, multiple 
subtopics, competing interests, substantial change, and hi h 
costs; the more legislators preferred ''internal, non legal, 
broad sources ·of information." On legislation viewed as 
less complex, legislators indicated preference for external 
and legal sources of information.12B 
Another national study on legislative information 
sources conducted by Root indicated the following: 
Legislators preferred not to receive 
information that was provided through per-
suasion campaigns, that was not targeted 
towards specific issues under debate or was 
not personally communicated. While 
legislative liaisons believed that the most 
useful information was provided before the 
legislative session began, legislators 
clearly preferred that information be 
provided during the regular session. When 
the results of the frequency, reliability 
and influence rating scales were compared, 
legislators ranked committee hearings, 
communication from constituents and other 
politically based sources of information 
127Nancy Walker Gemar, "An Analysis of the Resources 
Utilized by Selected California Legislators Within Three 
Orientational Dimensions and Decision Mechanisms Regarding 
Educational Decision Making," PAJ 43 (1982): 989-A. 
University of LaVerne. 
12BThomas L. Krepel, "Legislation Complexity and 
Legislator Preferences for Sources of Information," Plii 44 
(1983): 936-A. The University of Nebraska. 
contacts by 
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higher than all other sources. 
Institutional legislative liaisons were more 
critical of institutional communication 
efforts than were legislators. Although 
marked state and regional differences were 
found, the differences did not seem to 
cluster around regional patterns, indicating 
that the use of information sources by leg-
islators should be examined closely on a 
state by state basis.129 
Legislators appear to prefer lobbying 
individuals in formal meetings over 
~~~~~~~--:" organization _ _lnbb¥-i..-1:1~---a-nd-p-e-rsuas~on campaigns. While 
lobbyists see themselves as expert information sources, 
legislators in recent years appear to value more highly 
expert information from known inside referents, namely their 
own legislative aides and staffs. Evidence appears to 
support the view that as proposed legislation increases in 
complexity, financial cost, and degree of change, the more 
likely it is that legislators will rely on their own expert 
resources. 
The ultimate effect and influence of lobbying 
efforts by interest groups on legislators is not conclusive. 
Individual legislators are shown to respond differently to 
various lobbies and to specific lobbying techniques. 
However, when interest groups are well organized, they have 
been identified as the critical factor affecting the 
legislative process. 
129William Reid Root, ''Perceptions of State Legislators 
and Designated Legislative Representatives About Information 
Sources Pertaining to Higher Education," DA1 ...... 44 (1983): 
1003-A. Indiana University. · 
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The related literature was reviewed in Chapter 2. 
The chapter presented a theoretical model of the Universe of 
Politics of Education supported by appropriate scholarly 
literature and research as it related to interest groups, 
the tactics of advocacy, the strategies of influence, the 
super in ten dents ' laadersb.-ip---I"e-le--and---lctogi-s-lha"'t~"Co""'"r~aOFtFt'~"tccu>rdl<e><s'.----, 
This model and related literature formed the basis for the 
development of two survey instruments described in Chapter 
3. 
Chapter 3 describes the population, instrumenta-
tion, procedures, and statistical treatment of the data. 
The data are analyzed and discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 






This chapter describes the procedures used in the 
investigation. Focus in this section is on the 
instrumentation of the survey instrument, the selection of 
respondents for the pre-post field test of the survey 
instrument, the determination of questionnaire reliability, 
the description of the superintendents' sample, the 
description of the legislators' sample, and the statistical 
treatment of the data. 
Based upon a review of the scholarly literature 
and research, two quantifiable questionnaires were developed 
to measurably describe: 
1. The use and activities of paid lobbyists within 
California school districts. 
2. The lobbying activities of superintendents with 
state legislators. 
3. Superintendents' views and attitudes towards their 
lobbying activities with state legislators. 
4. Superintendents' views regarding the perceived ef-
fectiveness of their lobbying activities. 
5. The comparison between the views of school admin-
istrators and those of state legislators regarding 
effective lobbying strategies. 
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The format for the organization of the two 
questionnaires is reflected in Table 1 1 Organization of the 
Survey Instruments. 
Table 1: Organization of survey Instruments 
ObjJ;~ .. c .. t.i.ve.s 
Objective 1 
District Paid Lobbyist 
Objective 2 
............ Questions ......... Quet>tiann<lire 
1-14 Administrative 
Questionnaire 




Superintendents' Views and 










Comparison of Superintendents' and 44-73 











The completed survey instruments were reviewed by 
a panel of experts composed of two university professors, 
and two school district administrators for analysis of 
clarity 1 ease of administration and construct consistency 1 
the match between the purposes of the investigation and the 
questions on the survey instrument. Based upon expert panel 
input the survey instruments were modified then reanalyzed 
by the expert panel. Upon finalization, the two 
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questionnaires were professionally printed. (Appendix A, 
and Appendix B.) 
.S .. el.e~tion_. __ o.f ... ResP.On4en.t.s .... fo.r ..... Pre.=Pos.t ..... .F.i .. e.1d ........ l'.e.s.t ......... of ........ tn.e 
S.urveY .... l.n.s.t:r.um.e.n.t . .: .. 
Identification of respondents for inclusion in the -~ 
pre-post field test of the Administrative Survey instrument 
was made through the use of the 1986 California Public 
Schools Directory. From each county section of the ~ ~--~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~ 
directory, the third listed school district was identified 
to form an initial candidate pool of possible respondents. 
Eliminated from this master county list were Del Norte, 
Mariposa, Mono, Plumas, San Francisco and Sierra as these 
counties have only one school district. This elimination was 
made to insure that in the major investigation which would 
include 25 percent of all school districts in the state, 
there would be representation from each California county. 
From the initial candidate pool of fifty school districts 
every fifth (5th) district was selected until 30 districts 
were chosen for inclusion in the pre-post field test of the 
survey instrument". The Administrative Questionnaire was 
-sent to the superintendent of each of the identified ~ 
districts . 
. D.e .. t .. e.rmin<;t.io!Lo.f .... Qu.es .. tionna.i.re .... R.e.l.i .. <;:b .. i.li.tY 
The field test of the administrators' survey 
instrument was undertaken using an explanatory cover letter, 
a coded questionnaire and a stamped, addressed return 
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envelope. Fifteen days later a second identical mailing was 
made to each of the 30 superintendents in the pre-post 
sample in order to obtain a reliability measure of the 
instrument. Fourteen matched questionnaires, 47 percent of 
the sample, were returned. Side-by-side comparative analysis 
of each set of matched questionnaires was undertaken. No 
significant differences in responses over time were 
identified, thereby establishing questionnaire reliability L---~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~ for use in the major investigation. Since the S2 target I 
l 
i 
population, the entire California State Legislature was 
involved in the study, no attempt was made to field test the 
Legislators' Survey Instrument. The Legislators' Survey 
Instrument was composed of item numbers 44 to 73 from the 
field tested Administrative Questionnaire. 
Selection of the superintendents' sample, S1, was 
made by choosing every fourth school district from the 1986 
California Public School Directory until 25 percent of all 
school districts in the state were identified. At the 
completion of the sample selection procedure the list was 
reviewed to insure representation from each California 
county. A total of 260 school districts and their respec-
tive superintendents were selected for participation in the 
investigation. Each identified superintendent was sent an 
explanatory cover letter, the field tested questionnaire and 
an addressed, stamped return envelope, Appendix C. 
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One hundred seventy, 66 percent, of the survey 
instruments were returned. Unsolicited reaction and re-
sponse to the survey instrument and to the general topic of 
the investigation was positive . 
. S..!JP.~.r.i.nt.~.nQ..~nts.~ _1\Q.m.i.n.is.t.l::ativ~ .... EXP.er . .i.e.n.c~ 
The administrative experience of the one hundred 
seventy superintendents in the sample, (S1 ), ranged from 1 
superintendents was 18-21 years. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of administrative experience for all 
superintendents. 
Table 2: Administrative Experience of Superintendents 
1 - 5 
4 - 6 
7 - 9 
10 - 13 
14 - 17 
18 - 21 
22 - 24 
25+ 
Totals 



















Superintendents in the investigation represented 
districts ranging in enrollment from 13 to 65,000 students. 
Table 3 shows the enrollment distribution for the 170 




Table 3: Enrollment Distribution 






















sample, S2, comprised the entire membership of the 1987 
California State Legislature which is composed of 40 state 
senators and 80 district assembly persons. 
The Legislator Survey Questionnaire, an explana-
tory cover letter and a stamped, addressed envelope, was 
sent to all legislators at their district officesl using the 
addresses provided in the California Journal's 1986 Roster 
and Government Guide, Appendix D. Initial return from the 
sample was 34 percent. A second follow-up mailing with 
questionnaire, explanatory letter, and a stamped, addressed 
envelope was sent to all nonrespondents at the state capi-
tol, Appendix E. 2 Seventy returns were received, for a 
total of 58.3 percent of all legislators. Five question-
naires were returned from newly elected lawmakers who 
indicated that they had no experience on which to base any 
1 Legislature not in session 
2Legislature in session. 
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opinion or response, giving the investigation a working 
return of 54 percent of the Sz. 
Statistical treatment of the data was completed 
through the mainframe computer facilities of the University 
of the Pacific using Digital Equipment Corporation VAX 
11/785 hardware and the Statistical Program for the Social 
._ __________ ~S~c~i~e~n~c~e~s~~s~o~f~t~w~a~r~e~.--~F~r~e~q~~u~e~n~cY. distributions and calculatk~~·o~n--------~~ 
~ 
of the means for all items on both the superintendents' and 
legislators' survey instruments were determined. Chi square 
tests of association were used to determine the differences 
between the perceptions of selected groups of superin-
tendents, and the differences based on district size. Two-
way analysis of variance was used to determine whether there 
were significant differences between the means regarding 
superintendents' and legislators' perceptions on effective 
lobbying practices. To avoid the possibility of Type I 
errors the .01 level was used to determine statistical 
significance. Table 4 summarizes the statistical methods 
used for each objective in the investigation. 
Table 4: Statistical Treatment of the Data 
... -·-··-----·-- ------- ··-·-·-···--·----····-·····--···--····-· SJ;;<~:tis.tic<~l .... T.r.eatmen.t ........ . 
Ol:l5.e.c .. t.iY..e ... 1. 













QJ:lje..c .. t.iYe ..... 3. 
Superintendents' Views and 
Attitudes Toward Lobbying 
-~~~~~__ll,A~c~t:Jil.'VLl~· t~:_l· _eecS__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ...... h-i----S-~-aa-r-e-T-e-s-t-s-o-f·~~~~~~~-:~ Association ~ 
Q,l;l.j . .e.c.tiY..e. .... A:. 
Superintendents' Perceived 
Lobbying Effectiveness 
Q,Pj .. ec .. t.i.Y..e. ..... 5. 
Comparison of Superintendent-
dents' and Legislators' Views 








Two-Way Analysis of 
Variance 
Chapter 3 described the instrumentation, the 
selection of respondents for the pre-post field test of the 
administrators' survey instrument, the determination of 
questionnaire reliability, the sample populations of 
superintendents and state legislators, and the statistical 
treatment of the data. 
In Chapter 4 the data are analyzed and discussed. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings, conclusions and 




ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
The data reported in this chapter are organized 
into three sections: District Lobbyists, the Superintendent 
as Lobbyist, and Superintendents and the State Legislature. 
DISTRICT LOBBYISTS 
.R.eg_is..t.e .. r..e .. d ...... LobbY.i:?ts. 
Thirty six school districts in the State of 
California have official, registered lobbyists. Registered 
distric.t lobbyists are of two types: lobbyists who are 
employees of a school district, and lobbyists who are 
employees of professional, contract service lobbying firms. 
The list of school districts and their registered 
lobbyist(s) is found in Appendix F. 
Within this investigation, 15 school districts, 9 
percent of the sample, have registered lobbyists. Four 
district lobbyists are employed or contracted on a full time 
basis, the rest are part time lobbyists. Fourteen lobbyists 
represent more than one district. Only one lobbyist 
represents a single district. In six cases, the lobbyist is 
a former school administrator. 
Four of the lobbyists have offices in a school 
district building. Fourteen lobbyists maintain a Sacramento 
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office. Seven of the 14 lobbyists have offices with other 
lobbyists. 
Communication with the district lobbyist is 
maintained in a variety of ways as shown in Table 5. 
The 
Table 5: School District-Lobbyist Communication 
Number 
Board Directives 4 11 
Board Hearings 13 2 
Meetings with 2 13 
Superintendents 
Meetings with 14 1 
Principals 
Meetings with 14 1 
Parents 
Town Hall 13 0 
Community Meetings 
Meetings with 9 6 
Advisory Committees 
District Position 5 10 
Papers 
N = 15 
most frequently used communication methods are board 
directives, meetings with the district superintendent and 
written district position papers. Conversely, lobbyist-
Table 6: Lobbyist-School District Communication 
and Activities 
Number 














Organize Legislative 4 9 _ 
~-------------------~Aleris ________________________________________________ __ 






Maintain Liaison with 
Lobbying Networks 







district communication is through the preparation of written 
legislation summaries, administrative in-service, and the 
tracking of pending legislation, Table 6. Additionally, the 
lobbyist organizes legislative alerts, letter writing 
campaigns and visits to legislators' offices. In all cases, 
the lobbyist maintains liaison relationships with other 
education lobbying groups and networks. 
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During the 1985-86 academic year, 506 legislative 
contacts were made by 101 district administrators outside of 
the superintendency. Superintendents in the sample 
identified 16 administrative positions, in addition to their 
own, that have the job requirement and responsibility of 
periodic contact with members of the state legislature. 
il-_____ __;T._,a..,b~l""e.,____,_7_~indic_at_as__t_bE_t i -tl-es-O-f-t-he---1-$-aam-i-n-i-s-t-r-a-H-v-e----,~ 




by each administrative classification. These raw data are 
being presented for the purposes of background information 
to illustrate that administrators, in addition to 
superintendents, are making legislative contacts. 
The greatest number of legislative contacts, 105, 
was made by 21 business managers. Eighteen associate and/or 
assistant superintendents made 85 contacts with legislators. 
Thirteen directors of curriculum made 60 contacts. Thirteen 




Table 7: Frequencies of Legislative Contacts by 
Administrators Other Than Superintendents* 
Administrative Total Contacts 
.Position ___ .. _____ ._. ____ . ---·--·--··---·N. ................................. w.i .. t.J:L ... L.egi.s ... lator.s. 
Business Manager 21 105 
Principal 13 48 
Associate/Assistant 18 85 
Superintendent 
Facilities Planner 5 36 
F~nanc~al Director 3 18 
Administrative Assistant 4 30 
Director: Curriculum 13 60 
Director: Personnel 7 37 
Director: Operations 2 4 
Director: Adult 3 13 
Education 
Director: Compensatory 4 21 
Education 
Director: Special 4 21 
Education 
Director: Research 1 8 
Director: Employee 1 5 
Relations 
Director: Instructional 1 5 
Materials Center 
Director: Public 1 10 
Information 
Total N Individuals 101 
Total N Contacts 506 





Superintendents indicated that district use of 
educational interest groups for legislative lobbying is 
generally confined to two organizations: the Association of 
California School Administrators and the California School 
Boards Association. Some limited use is made of the Parent 
----------~T~e~a~c~h~e~r~A~s~s~o~c~~~·a~t~i~o~n~,~t~h~e~C~a~l~~~-f~o~r~n~i~a~T~e~a~c~h~e~r~s~A~s~s~o~c~i~a~t~i~o~n~a~n~dL_ _______ _ 
l 
the California School Employees Association, Table 8. 
Table 8: District Use of Educational Interest Groups for 
Legislative Lobbying 
Org?.n.i .. z .. a . .t..i.o.n .. 
·----·---·----·---···-······-··-····-······--·- ... N.o ········-···-·-·························-··············· Yes 
N % N ........................................ ~ ..... % 
Parent Teacher 124 79.0 33 21.0 
Association 
Association of 17 10.8 140 89.2 
California School 
Administrators 
California Teachers 119 75.8 38 24.2 
Association 
California School 129 82.2 28 17.8 
Employees Association 
California Schools 24 15.3 133 84.7 
Boards Association 
Total Cases 157 
The frequency and use of other organizational 
lobbies and interest groups1 used by school districts in the 
sample is as follows: the Small School Districts 
............ _ .. ____ , __ ,, .... , .... _____ .... ,_., 
............. -........ _ . 
1 Please refer to Appendix G for list of California 







Association, 16; the Coalition for Adequate School Housing, 
8; the California Association of Large Suburban School 
Districts, 5; the Association of Low Wealth Schools, 5; the 
California Association of Administrators of State and 
Federal Programs, 2; and Schools for Sound Finance, 2. 
Eight school districts report using the services of their 
county office of education lobbyist. 2 
~------------------------------------------
2Please refer to Appendix H for list of County Offices 
of Education employing registered lobbyists. 
;;;:: 
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SUPERINTENDENTS AS LOBBYISTS 
Superintendents' Support and Involvement in Lobbying 
Eighty four percent of the California 
superintendents surveyed indicated that 'administrators 
should be lobbyists. ' Ninety-one percent 'support 
administrative lobbying' activities, and 85 percent report 
are ~nvolved in lobbying activities.' 
Superintendents identified ten major lobbying 
activities in which they participated during the 1985-86 
academic year. These lobbying activities included: 
1. Monetary contribution in support of an 
education issue 
2. Time contribution in support of an education 
issue 
3. Letters to legislators 
4. Telephone calls to legislators 
5. Telegrams to legislators 
6. Visits to legislator's local office 
7. Visits to legislators at the state capital 
8. Visits with legislators in the school 
district 
9. Visits with legislators at professional 
conferences 
10. Testimony before legislative committees 
Two lobbying activities, visits with legislators 
in the school district and monetary contributions in support 
of education issues were reported as being used by 44 
percent of the superintendents at least one-to-two times 
79 
during the 1985-86 school year. Thirty-eight percent of the 
superintendents indicated that visits with legislators at _ 
professional conferences were made one-to-two times. 
Thirty-seven percent of the superintendents 
reported that visits with legislators in the legislator's 
local office, and time contributions in support of 
education, were made one-to-two times during the year. 
~------------S __ t_a_t_e __ c_a~p~i_t_a_l __ l_e_g~i_s_l_a_t_i_v_e ___ v_i_s_i_t_s~,_w __ e_r_e __ m_a_d_e __ b~y __ 3_3~p~e __ r_c_e_n_t __ o_f ________ ~ 
the superintendents one-to-two times. Letters, however, ~ 
were used with greater frequency. Twenty six percent of 
the sample sent letters to their legislators three-to-four 
times during the 85-86 school year. 
In the 'never used' category, Table 9: Frequencies 
of Superintendents' Lobbying Activities, the lobbying 
activity not used by 53 percent of the superintendents is 
the telegram. While 69 percent of the superintendents state 
that they have not or did not testify at a legislative 
committee hearing, 21.7 percent indicated that they have 
l 
.3 
testified one-to-two times, and 4.9 percent testified 
three-to-four times. During 1985-86, 30.1 percent of the 
superintendents in the sample gave testimony before 







Education Reform - Middle Schools 
Funding for K-12 Instructional Materials (4) 
High School Physical Education Requirements ~--------------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---------~ 
Impact: A.B. 813 ¥ 
Mentor Teacher Program 
Pilot Project: Year Round Employment of Teachers 
PL 874 
Project Life Lab 
School Facilities 
School Finance (3) 
School Housing 
School Reorganization 
Small District Finance 
Small District Transportation (3) 
Special Education 
Textbook Allocations 
Timber Tax Revenues 
Urban School Concerns 
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The lobbying activity used by the greatest number 
of all the superintendents surveyed is the use of letters. 
Ninety-seven percent of the sample reported that they wrote 
to legislators during the 1985-86 school year. Telephone 
calls, the second most frequently used activity, were made ~ 
c;-
by ninety-two percent of all superintendents. The rank 
order of frequency of greatest use by all superintendents is 
------------~a~s~ __ ~f~o~l~l~o~w~s~=----~l~e~t~t~e~r~s~,~--~t~e~l~ephone calls, monetary 
contributions, time contributions, legislators' visits to 
school districts, legislative visits at professional 
conferences, superintendents' visits to legislators at local 
offices, superintendents' visits to legislators at the state 







Superintendents' Views of Perceived Lobbying Effectiveness 
Following determination of frequency of lobbying 
activities, superintendents were asked to rate what they 
believed/perceived to be the degree of ultimate effect of 
each lobbying activity. Results of degree of perceived 
effectiveness with state legislators are shown in Table 10. 
The lobbying practices which received the most validation 
ect1veness fell in the 'effective' range. These 
lobbying activities are: monetary and time contributions in 
support of education issues; telephone calls to legislators; 
visits with legislators at the state capital, in 
legislators' local offices, and in the school district; and 
testimony before legislative committees. Lobbying 
strategies of perceived 'neutral' effectiveness with 
legislators are: letters, telegrams and visits with 
legislators at professional conferences. 
Analysis for rank order of superintendents' 
perceptions of effectiveness regarding their lobbying 
activities with state legislators indicates that the number 
one ranked lobbying activity with the highest combined 
percentage of effective and most effective responses, 66.6 
percent, is personal visits with legislators at the state 
capital. The second ranked effective lobbying activity 
identified by 65.9 percent of the superintendents is 
legislator's visits in the school district. 
.=:_•-,·~----'------:-____ 
83 
Table 10: Effectiveness of Superintendents' Lobbying Activities: Percent Response 
Combined 
Very , , , , Very :Effective+: 
' ' ' ' Lobb~ing Action Ineffective: Ineffective :Neutral:Effective :Effective :ver~ Effec. ~ Rank 
' 
' Visits to Sacramento 4.6 5.7 ' 23.0 35.6 31.0 66.6 
' 
' 
' Visits in School District 4. 5 8.0 ' 21.6 44.3 21.6 65.9 0 
' 
Money Contribution 3. 4 5.4 26.8 42.9 21.4 64.3 3 
' 
' Telephone Calls 1.9 13.6 28.2 40.8 ' 15.5 56.3 4 
' 
' 
' Visits to Legislator's ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' District Office 8 .1 9.3 :_2u_~_3B.A___:~~ U--:-s~s I 
Time Contribution 5.4 5.4 33.7 37.0 18.5 55.5 6 
Letter Writing 1.0 7.8 36.9 35.0 19.4 54.4 7 
Legislative Hearing 
Testimony 10.3 12.1 25.9 34.5 17.2 51.7 8 
Telegrams 7.6 13.6 37.9 25.8 15.2 41.0 9 
Visits at Professional 
Conferences 8.1 16.3 47.7 20.9 7.0 27.0 10 
N:169 
Closely following the first and second ranked 
direct lobbying strategies of personal visits, the third 
ranked technique is the indirect lobbying practice of 
monetary contributions to organizations in support of 
education issues. Telephone calls, the fourth ranked 
lobbying activity is an indirect activity, while the fifth 
ranked, visits to legislators' local area offices, is a 
direct lobbying practice. The sixth and seventh ranked 
activities, time contribution to an organization in support 
of an educational issue and letters to legislators, are both 
indirect activities. Legislative committee hearing 
testimony, a direct lobbying practice, is ranked eighth, 
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followed by telegrams and visits with legislators at 
professional conferences, the ninth and tenth ranked 
lobbying strategies. 
Cross tabulation through chi square analysis of 
lobbying activities for those superintendents who positively ~ 
support lobbying, Table 11, indicates significance at the 
.01 level for four lobbying strategies. Superintendents who 
'support' lobbying are more likely to write letters to their ~ ~------~~-=~~~~~==~~~==~~~~--~~ 
legislators. These superintendents, supporters of lobbying, 
I also tend to hold high effectiveness beliefs and 
expectations for their use of the lobbying practices of 
letter writing, telephone calls, their visits with 
legislators at the state capital, and for legislator visits 
in their school districts. 
A similar pattern was found for those superinten-
dents who are 'involved' in lobbying. These superinten-
dents, the involvers, are more likely to make a time 
1 
contribution to an organization in support of educational 
issues and to make frequent telephone calls to legislators. 
Involvers also appear to hold positive expectations for 
= high effectiveness for their use of letters, telephone ~ 
calls and their legislator visits at the state capital. 
-~-----
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Table 11: Cross Tabulation of Superintendents' Lobbying Activities by Support for Lobbying and 
Involvement in Lobbying 
-
~ 
Support tor Lobbying Involved in Lobbying ~ 
s. 
" 
Frequency Effectiveness Frequency Effectiveness ~ 
" ~ 
x" df sign x· df sign x'" df sign X,_ df sign ~ 
Monetary Contribution 10.01 8 .260 13.17 
' 8 .100 13.32 5 .020 9.43 4 .050 ~ 
I I 
I I 
Time Contribution 10.35 10 .410 I 14.03 8 .080 I 20.39 5 .001 11.08 4 .080 I I 
I I 
I I 
Letter Writing 40.19 10 .ooot: 54.37 8 .ooo•: 9.76 5 ,080 56.43 .ooo• 
' 
I ~ I I 
1 eiephone Cails 12.45 10 .250 28.72 8 .ooo•: 22.12 5 .ooo•: 18.32 4 .001' 
Telegrams 5.59 10 .840 9.70 8 .280 5.79 5 .320 10.04 .030 
Visits to Legislators 16.48 12 .160 16.30 8 .030 6.22 6 .390 6.73 .150 
at Local Office 
I 
I 
Visits to Legislators 7.45 10 .680 18.94 8 .ow: 12.58 5 .020 21.43 . ooo• 
at State Capital 
I 
I 
Visits with Legislators 16.85 10 .070 18.24 8 .o1o•: 8.33 5 .130 9.25 .050 
in School District 
Visits, Legislator at 5.27 10 .870 8.78 8 .360 2.90 5 .710 4 .13 .380 
Professional Conference 
Legislative Committee 2.54 8 .950 7.23 8 .510 5.69 4 .220 5.80 ' .210 
' Testimony 
*Significant at 0.01 Level 
<==== 
"" Comparison of views among all superintendents, !"" 
~ 
supporters and involvers, Table 12, for perceived 
effectiveness of lobbying strategies shows consistency of 
belief for direct lobbying through personal visits to 
legislators by superintendents and the use of telephone 
calls. Agreement in view is found between supporters and 
the second ranked practice of legislator visits to the 
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school district, whil& involvers agree with the fifth ranked 
-
activity of making a time contribution to an organization in ~ 
support of a particular education issue. All three groups 
show endorsement for the indirect practice of letters to 
legislators. 
Table 12: Perception of Effectivene>s of Lobbying Activities for 
Three Groups of Superintendents ! 
iF' 
Rank Percentage of Supporters Involvers 
all Superintendents 
1. Visits To Legislators 66.6 XXX XXX 
at State Capital 
2. Legislator Visits 65.9 XXX 
in School District 
j 3. Honey Contribution 64.3 
1! 
4. Telephone Calls 56.3 XXX XXX 
5. Visits to legislators 55.8 
at Local Office 
6. Time Contribution 55.5 XXX 
7. Letters 54.4 XXX XXX 
8. Legislative Hearing 51.7 
Testimony 
"=='= 
9. Telegrams 41.6 
-~ 




Relationship of Lobbying Activity and District Size 
A one-way analysis of variance was performed to ~ 
determine the degree of significant differences between the 
frequency of lobbying activities and district size. Fifteen 
significant differences at the .01 level were found. These 
data are summarized in Table 13. Superintendents from 
districts ranging in size from 1,000-5,000, and from 
~c=-.:-::---:::-::==-:=-::-::.:-::-=:-::---i~-I--------..Lo-,o-o-0=2U{U-o-o gave monetary contrfm!Eions to organizations ~ 
in support of lobbying efforts with greater frequency than 
did superintendents from districts with an enrollment of 
1-1,000 students. 
Telegrams are used more frequently by 
superintendents from districts where the enrollment is in 
] excess of 20,000 students than by superintendents from 
districts whose enrollment range is less than 10,000. 
Superintendents whose district enrollment falls in the 
10,000-20,000 range are more likely to visit legislators at 
their local area offices than are superintendents from 
districts whose enrollment range is 1-1,000 or 1,000-5,000. 
Face-to-face lobbying with legislators at the ~ 
E 
state capital is performed with significantly greater 
frequency by superintendents from the state's largest 
districts with enrollment greater than 10,000. Legislators 
are invited to appear and are lobbied with greater frequency 
in school districts ranging in size from 5,000-20,000, than 
in smaller districts having enrollments of 1-1,000. 
Testimony before legislative committee hearings is provided 
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significantly more often by the superintendents from the 







Table 13: Anova Results: Significant Differences Between Lobbying 
Frequency and the Variable of District Size 
Lobbying Activity 
Money Contribution 
To Organization in 
Support of Education 
Issue 
Telegrams 
Visits to Legislator's 
Local Office 
Visits to Legislators 
at State Capital 
Legislator's Visits 
in School District 
Legislative Hearing 
Testimony 












































Relationship of Perceived Lobbying Effectiveness to 
Freguency of Use 
Superintendents indicated that in their view, the 
most effective lobbying strategy is personal visits with 
legislators at the state capital. In terms of total use by 
all superintendents this lobbying practice ranks eighth in 
frequency of use as shown in the comparison of effectiveness 
and frequency, Table 14. The greatest use of state capital E 
visits is made by 33 percent of the superintendents who 
visit legislators one-to-two times during the year. 
Correspondingly, 31 percent of the superintendents never 
visit legislators at the state capital. 
Legislator visits to the school district, second 
in ranked order of effectiveness, has the highest use of all 
-
frequency subcategories. Forty-four percent of the 
superintendents invite legislators to their districts 
one-to-two times during the year, 19.6 percent invite 
legislators three-to-four times a year and 28 percent never 
invite legislators to the school district. This variability 
in use lowers the overall frequency ranking to fifth. 
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Table 14: Comparison of Effectiveness and Frequency of Lobbying Practices 
1 Frequency: : Percent ' Number of Times Used 1985-86 Never ~ 
' Effectiveness Rank Rank " Total Use' 1-2 ' 3-4 5-6 ' 7-8 ' 9-10 ' Used ~ 
" 
iiiiil 
" " 1. Visits to Legislators 8 " 69.9 33.1 16.2 9.5 2.7 7.4 31.1 • 
" i at State Capital " 
" 
" ~ 
" 2. Legislator Visits to 5 " 71.6 44.6 19.6 4 .1 2.0 1.4 28.4 
" ~ School District " 
" 
" 
" 3. Monetary Contribution 3 " 88.4 44.5 24.7 13.0 0. 7 5.5 11.6 
" 
" 







5. Visits to Legislators 7 " 67.4 11.8 26.1 20.9 ' 14.4 24.2 32.6 
" at Local Office " 
" 
" 
" 6. Time Contributions 4 " 85.4 37.5 22.9 7.6 6.9 10.4 14.6 
" 
" 
" 7. Letters " 97.4 11.8 26.1 20.9 14. 4 24.2 2.6 
" 
" 
" 8. Legislative Committee 10 " 30.1 21.7 4.9 2.8 0.7 0.0 69.9 
" ' Testimony " 




" • 10. Legislative Visits at 6 " 69.2 38.4 22.6 4.8 1.4 2 .1 ' 30.8 
l " Professional Conferences " " " " N:169 
Monetary contributions to an organization in 
support of an education issue and the use of telegrams, the 
third and ninth ranked items of effectiveness, are the only 
two instances in which there is a corresponding match 
between effectiveness and frequency of use. Monetary 
contribution has one of the high incidences of sub-category 
use, 44.5 percent, one-to-two times a year. Only 11 percent 
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of the superintendents indicated that no monetary 
-
contributions in support of organizational lobbying were '"' 
made during 1985-86. 
Telephone calls to legislators, the second most 
frequently used venue for lobbying, appear to have 
relatively constant use across all use subcategories despite 
its fourth ranked degree of effectiveness. Interestingly, 
23.3 percent of the superintendents indicated that they are 
in telephone contact with legislators 9-10+ times during the 
year. 
Superintendents' visits to legislators at the 
latter's local area office ranked fifth in effectiveness and 
seventh in frequency of use. While there do appear to be 
small groups of super±ntendents who consistently and 
regularly visit legislators, 32.6 percent have never visited 
a legislator locally. 
Time contribution to an organization in support of 
an education issue has a frequency rank higher than its 
effectiveness rank, a relationship of four to six. Time 
contributions appear to mirror the sub-category pattern of -
monetary contributions. In both cases, the greatest 
= 
~ 
percentage of use (contribution) is in the categories of 
one-to-two, and three-to-four times a year. 
Letters to legislators appear to be the lobbying 
practice used by the greatest number of superintendents, 
97.4 percent. Letters however, are viewed by the 
superintendents as having low effectiveness, seventh in 
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overall rank. Within the frequency sub-categories two 
separate groups of approximately 25 percent each, indicate 
that · their correspondence rates with legislators are 
three-to-four times a year or nine-to-ten+ times a year. 
The lowest frequency rank of all lobbying 
practices is testimony before a legislative committee. Only 
30.1 percent of all superintendents in the survey testified 
ljj!,. _______ d"'--..u,r_,i"'n~g! __ t.,.h!!."e,__,l"-'9"'8"-5"-=-"8-'6'---_js,.,c"'hw.~o'l.Lol__y_e_aL __ The_s_up~r_ini:_en_dentJ>'--'----i 
perceived effectiveness for legislative testimony is ranked 
eighth in their view. 
Superintendents tend to believe that visits with 
legislators at professional conferences is the least 
1 
effective lobbying strategy. Yet its percentage of total 
use, 69 percent, is identical to the total use of the most 
j 
effective lobbying practice, legislative visits at the state 
capital, and its degree of non-use, 30 percent, is also the 
same. Discrepancy in the degree of perceived effectiveness 
for legislative visits at conferences may be due in part to 
the factors of limited time, agenda control and lack of 
privacy for concentrated lobbying efforts. 
= 
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Obstacles to Lobbying 
The greatest obstacle faced by superintendents in ~ 
their lobbying activities with state legislators results 
from the varied job demands and responsibilities inherently 
associated with the position of superintendent. Ninety-one 
percent of all superintendents surveyed rated the degree of 
impact of job demands as shown in Table 15, as of substan-
tial to great effect in preventing or conflicting with 
lobbying activities. Closely associated with the obstacle 
of job demands is the view held by 89.1 percent of the 
superintendents that they lack the necessary time for 
lobbying activities with members of the state legislature. 
Distance from Sacramento, the third ranked 
obstacle, appears to have substantial to great impact on 
60.7 percent of the superintendents. Family and personal 
commitments, lack of training in lobbying methods and the 
perception that professional lobbyists may be more effective 
are rated as having a moderate to substantial impact on 
superintendents' ability to lobby. 
Lack of public support for lobbying, lack of ~ 
m"' 
information on education issues, as well as lack of 
information on pending legislation are seen by the 
superintendents as having little to moderate effect as 
obstacles. Superintendents' lack of interest in lobbying, 
the tenth ranked obstacle, appears to have the largest range 
of response from little through substantial. 
Table 15: Obstacles to lobbying: Rank and Degree of Impact 
Obstacle Rank Degree of Impact 
None Little Moderate Substantial Great 
1. Job Demands x----------x 
2. Lack of Time x----------x 












5. Lack of 
Lobbying Training 
6. Professionals More 
Elf icient 
7. Lack of Public 
Support 
8. Lack of Information 
on issues 
9. Lack of Information on 
Pending Legislation 
10. lack of Interest 






The resultant statistical dichotomy appears to have 
resulted from the relatively equal distribution of 
responses between the categories of little 1 22.4 
percent 1 moderate 1 28.6 percent 1 and substantial 1 24.2 
percent. Table 16 1 Obstacles to Lobbying: Superintendents' 
Response Distribution 1 shows that to 14.9 percent of the 
superintendents 1 lack of interest has no impact as an 







Superintendents' Perceptions of Support for Lobbying 
Superintendents, when asked, "What do you think is your 
communitv's view of your participation as an educational 
lobbyist?" reported that they believed that nine percent of 
the community saw them as very effective; thirty-one percent 
as effective, forty-nine as neutral, seven percent as 
ineffective and two percent as very ineffective. 
Superintendents also appear to believe that teachers hold 
similar views regarding superintendents' participation as an 
educational lobbyist. 
Table 17: Superintendents' Perceptions of Their Communities' and Teachers' 
Views Regarding the Supperintendent as Lobbyist 
Very Very 
Ineffective Ineffective Neutral Effective Effective 
Community View 2.6 7.3 49.7 31.1 9.3 
(N:lSl) 
Teachers' View .7 15.4 46.3 31.5 6.0 
(N=l49) 
When asked how they perceived the general public's view 
for all education lobbies, the superintendents believe that 
there is a normal distribution of views and support among 
the general public, Table 18. The majority of the general 
public, in the superintendents' opinion, hold neutral views 
of the education lobby. 
Table 18: Superintendents' Perceptions of the General Public's 
View of the Education Lobby 
Very Very 
Ineffective Ineffective Neutral Effective Effective 
General Public 
(N:154) 
2.6 16.9 60.4 16.9 3.2 
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Superintendents and the State Legislature 
Introduction 
Superintendents and state legislators were asked 
to rate the effectiveness of a variety of groups, 
organizations, and lobbying practices. An independent 
sample t-test was performed for each matched item on the two 






differences between the effectiveness rankings of each 
respondent group. 
Effectiveness of General Education Lobby Groups 
Both sample groups rated the effectiveness of 
seven general education lobby groups. Five differences were 
found at the .01 level of significance. Differences were 
found for superintendents, board members, parents, the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and paid district 
lobbyists, Table 19. 
Superintendents see themselves as effective 
lobbyists. Legislators do not. Legislators rate 
superintendents' lobbying effectiveness as 'neutral,' a 
significant difference in view. The superintendents' mean 
rating for superintendents was exceeded, in their view, only 
slightly by paid district lobbyists and the highly regarded 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Legislators' 
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mean ranking of superintendents' lobbying effectiveness was 
on par with that of parent lobbying effectiveness, 3.04, 
which is only slightly above that of board members. 
Superintendents gave higher effectiveness ratings, 
'generally effective,' to board members and to parents. ~ 
Again, a significant difference occurred in both cases. 
Legislators viewed each group as 'neutral' in effectiveness. 
'effective,' and 'neutral-to-effective' by the legislators, 
a statistically significant difference. 
Superintendents and legislators appear to have no 
difference in view regarding the 'ineffective-to-neutral' 
lobbying effectiveness of school principals. Both survey 
groups gave the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
the highest mean rank within the category of education lobby 
groups. However, a significant difference occurs due to 
discrepancies in perceived effectiveness; superintendents 
rank the state's chief education officer as 'effective-
to-very effective' while legislators rate his effectiveness 
as 'neutral to effective.' 
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Table 19: Analysis of Effectiveness of General Education Lobby Groups: 
Differences in Views Between Superintendents and Legislators 
-
Very Very ~ 












~ Superintendents 0.6 7.4 31.9 41.7 18.4 " 3.69 4.53 0.001 ~ 
" 
" 
" Legislators 7. 8 15.6 48.4 20.3 7. 8 " 3.04 
" j " " Principals' " " LM.bYiJt_o_Efiod--... 
" ~ 
" l " i'E " Superintendents 9.3 35.4 42.2 11.2 1.9 " 2.60 1.11 0.26 
" I " " Legislators 17.2 35.9 32.8 12.5 1 . 6 " 2.45 " " " Board Members' " 




" Superintendents 0.6 1J.6 29.0 37.0 19.8 " 3.61 4.19 o.oo• 
" 
" 
" Legislators 7. 7 21.5 40.0 24.0 6.2 " 3.00 
" 
~ 




Superintendents 5.6 21.7 18.0 30.4 24.2 3. 45 2.52 0.01' 
Legislators 7.7 24.6 29.2 32.3 6.2 3.04 
Teachers' Lobbying 
Efforts 
Superintendents 5.5 14.1 35.6 31.9 12.9 3.32 -1.03 0.30 
-
Legislators 4.6 18.5 18.5 40.0 18.5 3.49 "" ~
c 
-State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction 
Superintendents 0.6 1.2 7. 3 39.0 51.8 4.40 4.75 0.00' 
Legislators 0.0 14.3 22.2 38.1 25.4 3.74 
Paid District Lobb~ist 
Superintendents 0.7 4.0 24.2 44.3 26.8 ' 3. 92 2.56 0.01' 
" 
" 
" Legislators 3.1 16.9 10.8 27.7 41.5 " 3.56 
" Significant at .01 Level 
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Effectiveness of Educational Organizations 
-
" 
Respondents from both survey groups were asked to 
rank in order of perceived lobbying effectiveness the 
following education organizations: the Parent Teacher 
Association, the Association of California School Admini-
strators, the California School Employees Association, and 
the California School Boards Association, and the California 
Teachers Association. The rankings for each group are 
presented in Table 20. 
Three significant differences were found at the 
.01 level regarding differences in rank. Legislators ranked 
the Association of School Administrators and the California 
School Boards Association significantly lower than did the 
superintendents. Superintendents ranked the California 
School Employees Association lower than did the legislators. 
Agreement was evidenced for the first place ranking of the 
California Teachers Association and the last place rank of 
the Parent Teacher Association. 
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Table 20: Rank Order of Organizational Lobbying Effectiveness: 
Differences in Views Between Superintendents and Legislators 
Organization Rank Mean p ~ 
~ 
Parent Teacher Association ~ ~ 
Superintendents 5 3.96 1.19 0.23 ~ 
~ 
Legislators 5 3.76 
-
Association of California 
School Administrators 
~up_eLintaOJlents 2.93 -3_.RI__O_._OO* ~ ~ 
-
Legislators 4 3.5B 
~ California Teachers Association Superintendents 1. 61 0.55 0.58 
~ Legislators 1. 53 j California School Employees Association 
;;;;;;;;; 
] Superintendents 4 3.55 4.24 0.00* 
Legislators 2 2. 76 . 
California School 
Boards Association 
Superintendents 2 2. 7B -2.4B 0.01* j Legislators 3 3.24 
"=""= ] 
*Significant at .01 Level 
-..... 
-
I ~ j 
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Findings regarding perceptions of effectiveness 
were determined for each educational organization, Table 21. 
Again, as in rank order analysis, significant differences 
were observed at the .01 level for the Association of 
California School Administrators and the California School 
Boards Association. Legislators generally view these 
lobbies as 'neutral' in impact while superintendents rated 
give higher effectiveness ratings than did the legislators. 
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Table 21: Effectiveness of Educational Organizations: Differences 
in Views Between Superintendents and Legislators 
~ 
Very Very ~ 
Ineffective Ineffective Neutral Effective Effective " Mean p = II ~ 
" ~ 
" California Teachers " -~ 





Superintendents 0.6 1.2 14.7 39.3 44.2 " 4.25 2.29 0.02 
" 
" 
" Legislators 3.1 16.9 10.8 27.7 41.5 " 3.87 
" 
" 
" R-a-r:-e-n-t-.lea-e-h e-r " -; '




" Superintendents 0.6 12.3 38.0 30.1 19.0 " 3.54 2.57 0.01' 
" 
" 
" Legislators 9.4 15.6 37.5 26.6 10.9 3 .14 
California School Employees 
l 
Association (C.S.E.A.) 
Superintendents 0.0 8.6 32.7 42.6 16.0 3.66 0.34 0.73 
Legislators 1.6 17.2 23.4 34.4 23.4 3.60 
J Association of California 
School Administrators (A.C.S.A.) ' 
" 
" 
" Superintendents 0.0 7.4 25.8 47.9 19.0 " 3.78 5.44 0.00' 
" 
" 
" Legislators 3.1 21.9 48.4 18.0 7.0 " 3.06 
" 
" 
" California School Boards " 




" Superintendents 0.0 3.7 21.5 52.1 22.7 " 3.93 5.87 o.oo• ~ 
" 
" ~ 
" Legislators 4.7 20.3 42.2 23.4 9.4 " 3.12 ~ -
" = 
-
<Significant at . 01 Level 
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Tactics of Advocacy: Direct Lobbying Practices 
Analysis for effectiveness of legislative contacts 
by individual superintendents indicates harmony in the 
shared perception of superintendents and legislators that 
individual superintendents are effective in their lobbying 
efforts, Table 22. A similar agreement exists to a slightly 
lesser degree for direct lobbying by a delegation of school 
administrators. 
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It is important to note that there appears to be 
significant differences between legislators' attitudes and 
perceptions regarding the effectiveness between 
superintendents-in-general, and specific, individual 
superintendents. In the former case, legislators rate 
superintendents as 'neutral,' mean 3.04; in the latter case, 
individual superintendents are rated as 'effective,' mean 
_____ ____.4 ~1D·~--'rhia__di£f_e_r_enJ:_e_in view mav be due to legislators' 
j 
linking of superintendents-in-general, with the Association 
of California School Administrators which appears to be less 
highly regarded than other educational lobbying groups in 
overall effectiveness. In addition, legislators, in 
response to the two survey items, show marked differences in 
the total percentages of responses in effective-to-very 
effective categories, Table 23. Eighty four percent of the 
legislators validate the efforts of those specific 
superintendents. These data support the findings of Gibbons 
and Root that legislators prefer known referents. 
Table 23: Differences: Superintendents - General and Superintendents - Specific 












Use of testimony before a legislative committee 
borders on statistical significance. This is due in part to 
the view held by 29.2 percent of the legislators that 
legislative committee hearings are very effective sources of 
information. 
Tactics of Advocacy: Indirect Lobbying Practices 
The rank order of legislators' preferences for 
indirect lobbying practices is letters, reports by 
legislative assistants, telephone calls, telegrams, and 
lastly, reports by the California State Department of 
Education. Superintendents by and large appear to hold a 
number of inaccurate perceptions regarding indirect lobbying 
practices and their subsequent effectiveness with the state 
legislature, Table 24. 
Superintendents tend to undervalue the effective-
ness of letters to legislators, the latter's number one 
choice. Only 54.3 percent of the superintendents believe 
that the impact of letters would be 
'effective-to-very-effective' with legislators, while 71.0 
percent of the lawmakers said that this was the effective 
practice of choice. 
Legislators have a significantly higher regard for 
research reports prepared by their own legislative 
assistants, and significantly lower regard for reports 
prepared by the California State Department of Education 
than do superintendents. Seventy-two percent of the 
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legislators believe that State Department reports are 
'ineffective-to-neutral' as an information source for their ~ 







Table 24: Effectiveness of Indirect lobbying Practices: Differences ~ 
in Views Between Superintendents and Lobbyists 
Very Very 





Letters " ~ 
" 
" 
" Superintendents l.B 7.2 36.7 40.4 13.9 " 3.57 -2.15 0.03 
" 
I " " Legislators 1.6 4.8 22.6 48.4 22.6 " 3.85 
" ~. " " Telegrams " 
l " " " Superintendents 3.6 6.0 34.9 44.6 10.6 " 3.58 1.80 0.07 " " " Legislators 8.1 11.3 37 .I 33.9 9.7 " 3.25 " 
" 1 " Telephone Calls " ... :j " 
" ~ " Superintendents 1.2 7.2 18.7 45.8 27 .I I 3.90 3.23 0.00' I 
Legislators 3.2 9.5 36.5 39.7 11.1 3.46 
Research Reports by 
j Legislative Assistants Superintendents 1.8 15.3 39.9 28.8 14 .1 I 3.38 -3.27 o.oo• 
" 
" Legislators 0.0 7.7 23.1 50.8 18.5 " 3.80 -
" , 
"""' 
, E Reports by California State " 
" 
-
Department of Education " , 
" 
" Superintendents 1.2 11.0 39.0 41.5 7.3 " 3.42 4.38 0.00' 
" 
" , 
Legislators 4.6 30.8 41.5 20.0 3 .1 " 2.86 
" 
*Significant at .01 Level 
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Superintendents appear to believe that the 
preferred lobbying practice of legislators is telephone 
calls. Seventy-two percent of the superintendents believe 
that legislators view these calls as 'effective-
to-very-effective'. Legislators disagree significantly on 
this perception. Legislators rate telephone calls third in 





The use of telegrams shows no statistically 
significant degree of difference. Superintendents' mean 
rank order of choice is second, whereas legislators' rank is 
fourth. 
Tactics of Advocacy: Third Party Legislative Contacts by 
Individuals 
Use of third parties for legislative contacts 
indicates one statistically significant difference between 
the views of superintendents and legislators. According to 
the data displayed in Table 25, sixty percent of the 
legislators believe that school principals are 
'effective-to-very-effective' sources of information, while 
72.7 percent of the superintendents see principals as being 
only 'neutral-to-effective' as providers of information. 
Superintendents' perceived rank of choice was the 
paid, registered lobbyist as the primary third party 
legislative contact. It is interesting to observe that 
superintendents seemingly place greater value on the skills 
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of the registered lobbyist, than on the day-to-day-
real-world-of-schools experience and expertise possessed 
by principals. Superintendents, similarly, rank parent 
effectiveness over that of principals. Both legislators and 
superintendents appear to consider third party contact by a 
student as the least effective of the five groups having 
'neutral' impact on legislators. 
Table 25: Effectiveness of Third Party Legislative Contacts by Individuals: 
Differences in Views Between Superintendents and Legislators 
Very Very 
Ineffective Ineffective Neutral Effective Effective 
School Princioal 
Superintendents 1.2 20.0 43.6 29.1 6 .1 
Legislators 1.5 3.1 35.4 35.4 24.6 
Parent 
Superintendents 3.0 14.0 30.5 36.6 15.9 
Legislators 0.0 9.2 27.7 43.1 20.0 
Student 
Superintendents 9.1 23.8 30.5 25.6 11.0 
Legislators 3.1 20.3 31.3 25.0 20.3 
Paid, Registered Lobbyist 
Superintendents 0.0 3.8 37.5 44.4 14.4 
Legislators 0.0 6.3 43.8 45.3 4. 7 
*Significant at .01 Level 
1 Mean P 
3.18 -4.54 0.00' 
3.78 
3.48 -1.89 0.06 






" :: 3.05 -2.02 0.04 
" 
" 3.39 




Tactics of Advocacy: Third Party Legislative Contacts by 
Delegations 
Comparison between the effectiveness of individual 
and group legislative contacts shows that for both 
superintendents and legislators, the increase in group size 
positively affects perceptions of effectiveness. For 
delegations of school administrators, parents, and students, 
of superintendents and legislators, Table 26. 
A significant difference at the .01 level occurs 
regarding the effectiveness impact of delegations labeled as 
'taxpayers. ' Superintendents tend to believe that the 
taxpayer label has greater weight with legislators than do 
the legislators. Within the entire legislator survey 
instrument the largest individual effectiveness response 
rating was given to this item by 52.3 percent of the 
legislators indicating that groups labeled as taxpayers were 




Table 26: Effectiveness of Third Party Legislative Contacts by Delegations: 
Differences in Views Between Superintendents and Legislators ~ 
~ 
Very Very il 




Delegation of School " 
" ~ Administrators ""= 
" 
~ 
" Superintendents 0.6 2.4 25.6 42.7 28.7 " 3.96 0.20 0.84 
" 
" 









I " Superintendents 1.2 1.2 19.4 43.0 35.2 " 4.09 0.53 0.59 " " 
I " Legislators 0.0 6.2 16.9 44.6 32.3 " 4.03 I I I Delegation of Students 
n 
r Superintendents 3.0 17.6 32.7 33.3 13.3 3.36 -1.17 0.24 j I I Legislators 1.6 17.2 29.7 28.1 23.4 I 3.54 " " 
" Delegation of Group Labeled " 1 " as Taxpavers 
" 
" Superintendents 1.2 6.1 33.7 36.8 22.1 " 3.72 3.13 0.00* 
" 
" 




*Significant at .01 Level 
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Strategies of Influence 
Two major strategies of influence were assessed to 
determine the degree of correspondence between the 
perceptions of superintendents and legislators, Table 27. 
Town hall meetings are, in the legislative view, imminently 
preferable to Sacramento rallies, mean ratio of 3.60 to 
f-___________ z_._l_o_. _____ T_o_w_n __ h_a __ l_l __ m_e_e_t_~_·n~g_s __ a_r_e __ ~g_e_n_e_r_a_l_l_Y~_'_e_f_f_e_c_t __ i_v_e~,_· __ w_h_~_-_l_e _________ '~ 
rallies are clearly 'ineffective,' according to the 
legislators. 
Table 27: Effectiveness of Strategies of Influence: Differences 
in Views Between Superintendents and Legislators 
Very Very 
~ Ineffective Ineffective Neutral Effective Effective " ~,ean 0 II
~ 
" 
" Town Hall Meetings " 
" 
" 
" Superintendents 1.2 14.7 39.9 33.1 1!.0 " 3.38 -1.52 0.13 
" 
" 
" Legislators 0.0 9.2 32.3 35.4 20.0 3.60 




•Significant at .01 Level 
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Superintendents, however, appear to believe that 
legislators view rallies as being 'neutral' in impact and 
effectiveness. This rating occurs due to the fact that the 
superintendents' responses were normally distributed among 
the five effectiveness categories. However, t-test analysis 











Senate versus Assembly Differences 
T-test analysis of the differences in perceptions 
of lobbying effectiveness between state senators and members 
of the state assembly, Table 28, indicated no significant 
differences for 37 items on the legislators' survey 
instrument. Significant differences at the .01 level were 
found for item 62, effectiveness of a visit by a parent; 
item 65, effectiveness of parent delegation; item 66, 
effectiveness of student delegation; and item 67, effective-
ness of a group identified/labeled as taxpayers. In each of 
these cases members of the assembly perceived the effective-
ness of each group to be higher than did members of the 
senate. Owing to the smaller size of assembly districts it 
is reasonable to assume that parents, students, and 
taxpayers have a greater likelihood of being known to the 
assemblyman and may be seen by assemblymen as significant 
persons necessary for reelection. 
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Table 28: Analysis of Degree of Differences Between Senators and Assemblymen 
Question I Mean t-Value e-Value Question Mean t-Value e-Value 
-
Q 44 s 3.2170 Q 57 s 3.7270 ~ 
Q 44 A 2.8970 1. 240 3. 9210 .416 i$' .219 Q 57 A -. 820 ~ 
"' ~
Q 45 s 2.4780 Q 58 s 3.1810 " c:-= 
Q 45 A 2.4610 .060 .949 Q 58 A 3.2630 -.290 .775 ~ 
~ 
-
Q 46 s 3.4340 Q 59 s 3.3040 
-~ 
Q 46 A 2.7750 2.570 .013 Q 59 A 3.6050 -1.240 .221 
Q 47 s 3.2170 Q 60 s 4 .1730 
Q 47 A 2.9250 1. 040 .303 Q 60 A 4.0500 .590 .557 
E Q 48 s 3.6950 Q 61 s 3. 5650 F I Q 48 A 3.3750 1.100 .277 Q 61 A 3.9500 -1. 630 .108 
t Q 49 s 3.7390 Q 62 s 3.3470 ~ Q 49 A 3.7630 -. 090 . 927 Q 62 A 4.0000 -2.960 .004' Q so s 3. 7270 Q 63 s 3. 0000 
1i 
Q 50 A 3.5000 .870 .389 Q 63 A 3.6660 -1.340 .023 j Q 51 s 4.0870 Q 64 s 3.8260 Q 51 A 3. 7750 .990 .327 Q 64 A 4.0000 -.750 .453 
1 Q 52 s 3.2270 Q 65 s 3.6510 
'I Q 52 A 3.0750 .520 . 604 Q 65 A 4.2500 -1.800 .007' 
Q 53 s 3.8650 Q 66 s 3.0870 
Q 53 A 3.4750 1.390 .170 Q 66 A 3.8710 -1.930 .oo5• 
Q 54 s 3.3040 Q 67 s 2. 9560 
Q 54 A 2.9480 1.470 .147 Q 67 A 3.5250 -1.480 .016' 
Q 55 s 3.1810 Q 68 s 3.5650 
"""""' Q 55 A 3.1250 .210 .833 Q 68 A 3.4610 .580 .561 
-== 
Q 56a s 3.7140 Q 69 s 3.3910 
-E Q 56a A 3.6840 .090 .932 Q 69 A 3. 7250 -1.150 .116 
-
Q 56b s 3.6660 Q 70 s 3.7390 
Q 56b A 3.5940 .240 .808 Q 70 A 3.8750 -.630 .528 
C 56c s 1. 3180 Q 71 s 2. 8260 
Q 56c A 1. 6050 -1.260 .212 Q 71 A 2.8750 -.210 .837 
Q 56d s 2.6000 Q 71 s 4.2!70 
Q 56d A 2.8640 -. 770 .446 Q 71 A 3.8750 1. 57 .121 
Q 56e s 3.5710 Q 73 s 1.0870 
Q 56e A 3.1050 1.360 .180 Q 73 A 1.1000 -.05 .958 
•Significant at .01 level 
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Summary 
Chapter 4 described the analysis of the data. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings and conclusions of the 








FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
The reasons why superintendents lobby are as 
unique and as particular to each superintendent as are the 
specialized needs and demands encountered in the districts 
these schoolmen represent. The issue at hand in this inves-
tigation is not what legislation superintendents lobby for, 
but rather the lobbying activities superintendents use to 
achieve their respective aims and purposes. 
The operational definition of lobbying used in 
this study identifies lobbying activities as those goal 
directed actions designed to obtain particular ends through 
the use of the tactics of advocacy and/or the strategies of 
influence. The major focus of this investigation has been 
to describe the lobbying activities of California school 
superintendents and to compare the perceived effects of 
these lobbying activities as seen by the. superintendents and 
the members of the 1986-87 State Legislature. 
The findings of this investigation represent the 
views of one hundred seventy school superintendents and 
seventy state legislators who responded to a survey instru-
ment developed for each group by the investigator. Analysis 
of the data used the Statistical Program for the Social 
Sciences. The .01 level was used to determine statistical 






The value of any research lies in its contribution 
to the field from which the research was drawn. It is the 
intent of the following findings, conclusions and recommen-
dations drawn from the data to assist superintendents in the 
effective use of lobbying strategies in order to enhance 
their efforts in achieving desired legislative outcomes. 
Findings 
The discussion of the findings in this chapter is 
presented in three sections in order to address the 
objectives of the investigation. The section headings and 
the corresponding objectives are as follows: 
To describe the use and activities 
of paid lobbyists within California school 
districts. 
QbJectiv_e ___ 2: To describe administrators' views 
towards their educational lobbying activities with 
state legislators. 
To describe the lobbying activities 
of school administrators with state legislators. 
ObJec:tiv..e_4: To describe the views held by school 
administrators regarding the effectiveness of 
their lobbying activities with state legislators 
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Q.l:l.JeGt.iY.e ............. 5: To compare the views of school 
administrators with those of state legislators 
regarding effective lobbying strategies . 
. P..ist.r.iG:t .... Lol:ll:lYi .. s .. t.s.: .... Ql:l.Je.G .. t .. iv.e ....... l. 
The data presented in this section illustrate a 
t------abl-m-Be-r-s-f---i--n-~ere-s-'E-i-a;-f-i-ad-i-n-;-s-.--F-i-r-s-t----,---t:-h-e-us-e-o-f-p-aid.~,----~--
registered lobbyists is limited to very few California 
school districts and is generally confined to the use of 
part time lobbyists. Second, a school district's 
legislative contacts clearly appear to be the domain of the 
superintendent. 
Some legislative contacts are being made by 
school administrators other than the superintendent. 
Sixteen administrative positions were identified. The two 
most active positions reported are: the business manager 
and the associate and/or assistant superintendent. 
Extrapolating the number of contacts made by superintendents 
and their administrators to all school districts in the 
state indicates that California legislators face the 
possibility of being contacted by the administrative lobby 
in excess of 4, 900 times in a given year. This finding 
supports the views of Loomis and Cigler regarding the 
extreme degree of pressure legislators can face. The data 
show that a few school districts are making some limited 
use of educational interest group lobbies based on the 




The investigation supports the work of Case and 
King, Eason and Bane, and the research analysis of the 
investigator, that superintendents are interested in the 
topic of legislative lobbying, and that superintendents are 
in transition to a proactive philosophy regarding 
t-----~;t?-a-F-t-i--c i--p-a-t-i-an-i-n-t-l:l-e-p-a-l-i-t-i--G-S-af-e-ci-U-G-a-t-i-G-n~.---'TJh-S--------da-ta----~~ 
presented support the overwhelming belief of superintendents 
that administrators should be lobbyists, that they support 
lobbying, and as a result, are involved in lobbying 
activities. Extrapolation of these beliefs to all 
superintendents in the State of California appears to imply 
that lobbying and recognition of the need to lobby are a 
priority with superintendents. 
The data show that superintendents believe that 
the most effective lobbying technique is face-to-face 
contact with legislators confirming the work of Milbrath, 
Kennedy, Beavers, and Berry. In California, face-to-face 
legislative contacts take place at the state capital and in 
arranged visits where the legislator visits the school 
district. Although these direct advocacy tactics have high 
effectiveness rankings, they have frequency ranks of eighth 
and fifth place, respectively, in total use. Ninety-
seven percent of the superintendents in the investigation 
indicated that the lobbying practice used with the greatest 
frequency was the indirect advocacy tactic of letters to 
legislators. While the tactic has the highest frequency of 
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use, superintendents agree with Milbrath and Kennedy that 
the overall effectiveness of letters is low. 
The data, however, dispute the importance of 
legislative committee testimony as found by Milbrath and 
Kennedy. Superintendents appear to believe that committee 
testimony has low effectiveness. It must be noted that only 
30 percent of the superintendent sample had the opportunity 
to testify before a legislative committee during the 1985-86 
academic year. Additionally, there is disagreement between 
superintendents whose district enrollment is in excess of 
20,000 students, and superintendents from small districts, 
with less than 5, 000 students, regarding legislative 
testimony effectiveness. Superintendents from the larger 
districts believe testimony is effective. 
Early researchers in the study of administrators' 
lobbying practices did not examine perceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of monetary contributions to organizations in 
support of education issues. It was in this area that 
superintendents indicated congruence between their 
perceptions of effectiVeness and frequency of use. The 
tactic was ranked as third in both scales. 
The findings in the investigation did not support 
the 'no difference' hypothesis of Billy and Eason regarding 
lobbying practices of superintendents with respect to the 
variable of district size. Fifteen significant differences 
at the . 01 level were found. Monetary contributions were 
more likely to be given by superintendents from districts 
123 
whose enrollment range was 1,000 to 5,000 or 10,000 to 
20,000 than by superintendents whose district enrollment was 
less than 1,000 students. 
Telegrams are more likely to be sent to 
legislators by superintendents whose enrollment is greater 
than 20,000, than by superintendents whose enrollment is 
less than 10,000. Visits to a legislator's local area 
~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------:--
office is more likely to be made by superintendents whose 
enrollment range is 10,000-20,000 than by superintendents 
whose enrollment is less than 5,000. 
Visits to legislators at the state capital are 
more likely to be made by superintendents whose district 
enrollment is above 20,000 than by district superintendents 
whose enrollment is less than 10,000. Similarly, 
superintendents from districts whose enrollment is in the 
10,000 to 20,000 range visit the state capital more often 
than superintendents of. the smallest districts, those whose 
enrollment is less than 1,000. Legislator visits to school 
districts appear to be the result of the efforts of 
superintendents whose enrollment is in the 5,000 to 20,000 
range; superintendents from the smallest districts do not 
seem to use this particular strategy. 
It is important to note that while superintendents 
express high philosophical and action commitments to 
lobbying activities with legislators, these same super in-
tendents, 90 percent of the sample, indicate that the 
greatest obstacles to lobbying are their day-to-day job 
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demands and the lack of time. These pressures may explain, 
in part, why California superintendents exhibit a marked 
dichotomy between the lobbying techniques they identify as 
most effective, visits with legislators at the state 
capital, and the lobbying techniques used with the greatest 
frequency, letters, telephone calls and monetary 
contributions to organizations in support of education 
issues. It is easier to write a letter, telephone, or give 
money rather than to go to Sacramento when one is busy and 
under pressure. 
Similarly, the face-to-face direct advocacy 
variation technique of inviting legislators to the district, 
while it may be a defense mechanism or coping strategy at 
times, is a technique that has two distinct advantages. 
First, it allows the superintendent to control the agenda 
for specific purposes, and second, it is a no-cost or low 
cost i tern for the school district. This tactic is used 
predominantly by superintendents of districts with 
enrollments of 5,000 to 20,000. These superintendents may 
also have fewer numbers of administrative support personnel 
= 
to address the many demands associated with school district 
operation. It is these factors that give additional support 
to the rationale for why the tactic of inviting legislators 
to the district is viewed by superintendents ::lS the second 
most effective lobbying strategy. 
How superintendents become skilled legislative 
. ~~-,---"··-. 
lobbyists has not been an area of scholarly /study. This 
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investigation makes a contribution by identifying that, from 
the superintendents' point of view, there is a need for 
training in lobbying methods. This lack of training is 
perceived by the superintendents as an obstacle of moderate 
to substantial impact in their associations with 
legislators. Further analysis of this perceived need and 
the possible development of training programs to increase 
lobbying effectiveness would be useful as areas for future 
study. 
Research on the relationship between 
superintendents' lobbying activities and their community's 
awareness and understanding of these activities appears to 
have been an area of limited scholarly investigation. It is 
to this area that this investigation appears to make a 
contribution by illustrating that the closer the public is 
to the source of lobbying activities, the more likely that 
public will be knowledgeable about the goals and purposes of 
the lobby. The data support the premise that a school 
district community is more likely to be aware of the 
lobbying activities of their superintendent than are 
individuals of the broader general public. This support may ~ 
be due to the fact that the district community, its parents 
and teachers, have a vested interest in the outcomes of the 
superintendent's lobbying efforts. In some cases, district 
parents and teachers may be engaged in indirect advocacy 
tactics, such as third party legislative contacts or letter 
writing. Involvement in these activities would, generally, 
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contribute to the community's level of understanding about 
the education lobby and the effectiveness of the lobbying 
role of their superintendent. 
= ~= 
Data presented in this section indicate that from 
three different perspectives, superintendents are not 
r egaraea:-a:s e f f ec~.rv-e-l-o-b-by-i-s-t-s----:S-y-m-e-m-Se-r-s-O-f__tD~e-S-t_a_te~----~ 
legislature: First, superintendents as a 'general group' 
are seen to be of neutral effect in lobbying efforts. The 
distribution of legislator responses on this item closely 
approximates the normal probability curve. Second, the 
chief administrative organization, the Association of 
I California School Administrators is ranked fourth out of 
five education interest groups. Third, ACSA is also 
perceived by legislators as being neutral in lobbying 
r 
I effectiveness, and has the lowest mean scores of any group. 
I Again, legislators' responses to the item are evenly 
. J' distributed along the normal probability curve. In each of 
these three instances the data represent significant 
differences at the .01 level between the views of 
superintendents and legislators. The consistency of the data 
appears to support the strength of the legislators' views 
regarding their perceptions of non-effectiveness. 
The data focus on a number of questions: Do 
superintendents perceive themselves as superintendents first 
or as ACSA members? Do legislators view superintendents 
apart from ACSA? To what degree are the lobbying successes 
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and failures of superintendents and those of ACSA coloring 
the perceptions of legislators? Based on the present 
evidence, the answers to these questions are unclear. Due to 
the importance both to superintendents and to ACSA, 
investigation of these questions would make a valuable 
contribution to the scholarly literature. 
Legislators' responses appear to support the work of Dye 
regarding the effect of interest group size. Clearly, the 
first ranked interest group, the California Teachers 
Association, and the second ranked California School 
Employees, do have large, active, vocal members, when 
compared to the size of ACSA. It has been noted that 
legislators give lower effectiveness ratings to these groups 
than did the superintendents. 
Analysis of the lobbying preferences of state 
legislators reaffirms the work of Root and Berry regarding 
lawmakers' preferences for direct advocacy tactics. 
Legislators gave the highest mean rank order to: one, visit 
by a district superintendent, 4.10; two, parent delegation, 
4.03; three, legis la ti ve testimony, 4.00; and four, 
administrative delegation, 3.93. In three of these 
instances, superintendent visits, parent delegations, and 
administrative delegations, the superintendents' perceptions 
of lobbying rank and effectiveness were confirmed. While 
legislative testimony was lower rated by the superin-




dichotomy in lobbyist-legislator perception described by 
Anderson and Sentman, and Berry. 
California legislators appear to have a higher 
regard for the effect of letters than might be assumed from 
the literature on legislators' attitudes toward lobbying 
practices. Legislators' mean rank for letters, 3. 85, was 
higher than for all other indirect advocacy methods; 
telephone calls, 3.46; telegrams, 3.25. Superintendents, 
however, believe that telephone calls are more effective. 
This difference in perception is a significant contrast 
between the two sample groups. 
The data presented appear to support Gemar's study 
of California legislators in which she reports that 
legislators viewed expertise as a valuable resource. 
Clearly, legislators value the expertise of individual 
superintendents (superintendents-specific). Eighty four 
percent of the legislators indicated that these individual 
superintendents are effective to very effective information 
sources. While legislators hold individual superintendents 
in high regard, the legislators also appear to value their 
own inside resources and experts for preparation of 
effective legislative reports, mean 3.80. These data 
support Krepel's inside referent research. Superintendents, 
however, seem to be significantly unaware of this fa6et of 
legislator regard for their own legislative reports. 
One of the most unexpected findings in the 





between superintendents and legislators regarding the 
effectiveness of principals as third party legislative 
contacts. Legislators believe that principals are 
effective, mean 3.78, sources of information. Super in-
tendents hold a less positive view of these subordinates, 
mean 3.18, and rank them only slightly above a legislative 
visit by a student, 3.05, and Sacramento rallies, 3.00. 
Scholars have not yet begun to study the lobbying 
activities of principals. There is however, considerable 
research identifying the principal as the critical element 
in the development of effective schools. It may be 
reasonable to assume that because of the importance of the 
principal's role in creating and maintaining educational 
change, the principal's expertise is valued by legislators. 
This being the case, the inclusion of principals should be 
considered by district superintendents as adjuncts to their 
own lobbying efforts with legislators. 
Conclusions 
Superintendents must develop a personal relation-
ship with legislators and legislative assistants as well as 
those individuals assigned legislative committee oversight 
duties. 
Superintendents need to understand the workings 
of the state legislature and maintain high information and 
awareness levels about proposed and pending legislation. 
Superintendents should capitalize on their 
position as district superintendents instead of representing 
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other organizational interests when dealing with legislators 
on education issues. 
Superintendents should develop proactive, long 
range, direct advocacy action plans to inform legislators 
about their district achievements, goals, needs, and the 
impact of proposed and enacted legislation. These action 
lans should maximize opportunities for direct advocacy. ~------~~~~==~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----------­
~ 
Superintendents should match lobbying activities 
with the lobbying preferences of legislators. In the 
California State Legislature the order of the ten most 
preferred legislative strategies is: superintendent's 
visits, parent delegation, legislative testimony, 
administrative delegations, letters, legislative reports, 
principal's visits, parent visit, town hall meetings, and 
student delegation. 
Superintendents should encourage, enlist and 
train principals for participation in legislative lobbying 
activities in order to capitalize on the principals' 
legislative endorsement. 
To meet the superintendents' perceived need for 
training in lobbying techniques, training programs should be 
presented by master lobbyists who are familiar not only with 
the workings of the state legislature, but with the politics 
of education, and the needs of schools and students. 
Ideally, these training programs should be incorporated as 
part of the graduate program of studies at institutions of 
higher learning. 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
Based upon the evidence which shows that 
legislators have different perceptions of effectiveness for 
superintendents-in-general, superintendents-specific and the 
Association of California School Administrators, there is a 
1------u.,e_d____!:_o___e=ine_mor_e_c~_o_s_e~~-th_e__de_gr_e_e__t_Q___Wh_i_c_h__AC~SuA,_'~s"---____ ,--
~--
lobbying activities color and/or influence legislators' 
perceptions of superintendents who are members of the 
Association. 
The research points out that principals have high 
credibility with members of the state legislature. In order 
to explore the impact of principals' lobbying efforts with 
legislators, replication of this study would add to the body 
of knowledge regarding the principal's leadership role in 
state educational politics. 
The investigation identifies sixteen 
administrative positions, outside of the super in tendency, 
1 that have some form of legislative contact as part of the 
job requirement. Analysis needs to be made to determine the 
type and extent of these lobbying efforts, as well as the 
degree of philosophical and action commitments these 
administrators have for these legislative lobbying 
activities. The goal of this research would assist 
educational leaders in developing comprehensive legislative 
action plans built upon the lobbying efforts of greater 
... ·---- ------------
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numbers of administrators. This type of research would add 
to the body of research on the emergence of the political 
activist administrator as an educational legislative change 
agent. 
Within the context of California educational 
politics the findings of this investigation illustrate that 
present-day politics, as it applies to the superintendents' 
involvement, have become increasing complex since the 
definitive analysis of Bowles in 1967. Bowles defines the 
initial period of administrator involvement in a singular 
context, meaning the complete control of the political arena 
by one person, namely the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, 1849-1875. With the organization of the 
California Teachers Association, educational politics 
entered into what Bowles refers to as a monolithic period. 
In this period, which was in effect for approximately 
eighty-five years, 1875-1960, a small group of 
-superintendents dominated the political scene with their i= 
ability to not only introduce legislation and guide it 
through to adoption, but to also influence the electorate to 
approve constitutional reforms. The monolithic period 
reached its zenith when the few members of the administra-
ti ve leadership lobby could control both the legislature 




Following the monolithic period, California "'-
education politics entered into a transitory phase brought 
about by adverse reaction to the control exerted by the 
small group of administrator power brokers. With the rise 
of self determinism on the part of the legislature and the 
governor, and the inclusion of lay citizens on state 
t------"'a"'d'-'v'-"'i"s"'o""r"-"'_-'b.,.o.,.a""r,.,....d"'s'J __ ""t"h"'e'----~h..,o~l'"'d'------"'o"'f_pow e r of the pres t i g"'e"-----~·c 
l gatekeepers gradually began to erode. This reduction in power for the small administrator lobby, coupled with the 
rise of other educational interest groups, such as the 
California School Boards Association and the Small Schools 
Association, and other heavily funded non-education lobbies 
created the current competitive climate for educational 
politics. 
The present investigation shows that from the 
superintendents' perspective there is a .m:::e<'it .... ne.ed .. to .. be 
.. in.Y.ol.Y.e.d in the legislative arena. Further that on both a 
Philos.oPhic<'il ... S~nd ... <'iction .. Je.YeJ. super in t enden t s .S\X.e ..... c.ommi. ttecl. 
to ...... .l.o!:>.!:>.Y.ing activities as part of the administrative job 
function. This commitment differs vastly from the non-
political views of the administrative profession during the 
1970's. The evidence of the study also illustrates that the 
small numbers of superintendents involved in lobbying during 
the monolithic period have grown su~stantially to include a 
large proportion of the current superintendents. While not 
a major focus in the investigation, the report by superin-
tendents that their subordinates are also involved in 
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legislative lobbying, points out that the numbers of 
'administrative actors' involved in the political scene have 
increased tremendously from earlier periods. The increase 
in the numbers of administrative actors and the commitment 
of superintendents to be involved in educational politics 
suggest that California has entered into a period of 
t------=mmi_t:t~d res ponsibi_liJ:y_; __ a__t_im_e_Wh_en_th_e_s_trong_J:lB_r_s_on_a_l ____ ,--
~ 
¥ 
convictions of superintendents regarding the importance of 
lobbying increases their commitment and efforts in behalf of 
priority legislative concerns and issues. 
From the evidence gathered from the members of the 
State Legislature i.t .... is ..... li.keJY .. :tha.t this Pe+:iod o:t committed 
resPonsibiJ.i:tY .... Will ...... G.ontin.ue .. <;nd .. exp;;;nd, if super in tenden ts 
begin to include principals as allies and colleagues in 
their legislative lobbying efforts. The perceived legisla-
tive credibility of principals when combined with the 
existing prestige and endorsement of legislatively known 
superintendents, both using lobbying techniques of maximum 
efficiency, offers administrators increased opportunities to 
achieve their aims in the competing environment of 
educational politics. 
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